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ABSTRACT 
The transformation of the political relations in Europe at the dawn of the 21st 
Century resulted in deep changes in the concept of security and collective defense. 
In the context of NATO enlargement, Romania, like other Central and Eastern 
European countries, reconsidered its political and strategic position in this new 
environment, started profound reforms in its security institutions and continues to 
consolidate the democratic statecraft. 
This thesis examines the steps Romania, as an aspiring country, has to complete 
for the admission into the Alliance. The analysis mainly focuses on the process of defense 
resource allocation and reorganization of the Armed Forces as requirements imposed by 
NATO through the concept of the Membership Action Plan. A detailed description of the 
defense resource allocation process is presented and analyzed against relevant theory on 
policy analysis and contemporary budgeting systems, in particular PPBS. 
The analysis concludes that through the implementation of the new defense 
resource management system and reorganization of the Armed Forces, Romania can meet 
its defense needs and become an important military contributor to NATO. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
At the beginning of the 21st century Europe's political and economic order is by 
no means settled. It is rapidly shirting and Europe is changing in a new political 
environment. The Cold war is over, the major threats and fears-of global war's 
cataclysms are gone, bringing deep and dramatic changes into the bipolar model of 
international relationship between the super powers and rearranging the security relations 
and the existing status quo. 
The traditional East-West confrontation and the dividing line in the core of 
Europe disappeared. At the same time, European security institutions underwent 
significant changes, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved but NATO unquestionably remained 
the security and defense framework of Western Europe.1 NATO as a collective defense 
institution had to reconsider its traditional strategic operational raison d'etre and adopt 
new missions, open its doors for new members, and spread the security umbrella over 
them.2 
As NATO membership and functions increased, it changed from a "latent war 
community" to something akin to an international regime aimed at collective security. 
NATO has become an alliance unlike any other. As compared to historical precedents or 
1
 Brenner, Michael, NATO and Collective Security, p. 249, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998. 
i,   2tCroft'Stuart' Red™>nt, John, Wyn Rees, G., Webber, Mark, The Enlargement of Europe, pp. 22-48 
Manchester University Press, 1999. 
its own prior experience, criteria for successful integration into the "new" NATO now 
have little to do with a state's military contribution or strategic advantage, factors that 
used to dominate all others.3 Today the principal emphasis is on how a state and its 
respective army behave. 
The Washington Summit posed a serious challenge for the candidates: 
We welcome the efforts and progress aspiring members have made, since 
we last met, to advance political, military and economic reforms. We 
appreciate the results achieved, and look forward to further progress by 
these countries in strengthening their democratic institutions and 
restructuring their economies and militaries.4 
B. OBJECTIVES 
In view of the new approach to NATO membership, this thesis seeks to advance 
an understanding of the steps that aspiring countries have to complete for admission into 
the Alliance. The analysis mainly focuses on the process of defense resource allocation 
and reform of the military organization, but also includes an overview of the political and 
economic reforms, with a special emphasis on Romania. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis discusses the following questions: 
• What are the requirements imposed by NATO for the aspiring states? 
• What are the ways to assure national security for the countries that 
belonged to the Warsaw Pact? 
• What is the impact of defense expenditure on economic growth? 
3
 Nelson, N., Daniel, Civil Annies, Civil Societies, and NATO's Enlargement, Armed Forces and 
Society, New Brunswick, Fall 1998. 
^Washington Summit Communique: Issued by the Heads of States and Governments Participating in 
fee Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999, Available (Online)- 
[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htmj.10March2001. 
• Can defense be treated as an economic problem? 
• What are the historical approaches in allocating defense resources? 
• Is the American Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) a 
solution for defense resource management? 
• Does the amount of resources allocated to defense determine the Armed 
Forces reorganization process? 
• What is Romania doing in preparation for a possible invitation to join the 
Alliance? 
D.       SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This research is concerned with the entire budgetary process, which includes all 
activities necessary to effectively and efficiently allocate and manage defense resources. 
Although, a future decision regarding the admittance of new members into NATO may 
seem to be merely political, the military component still contributes heavily in any 
analysis of whether a country is invited to join NATO. 
In   the   1990s,   many   studies   were  performed   on  military  spending   and 
organizational reform. The starting point for any such analysis would be to accurately 
determine a countrys' defense budgets and their yearly expenditures. Traditional sources 
of military information, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA), the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (ESS), the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPPJ), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Military Balance, 
the RAND Corporation, and the US Department of Defense (DoD), published military 
expenditures of countries based upon data provided by the countries in question. These 
organizations have often recognized that the quality of their data suffers and for this 
reason the accuracy of their analysis is quite low. 
In addition, discrepancies between the results of the analysis performed by the 
institutions previously mentioned are also driven by the use of different definitions, 
criteria and estimation procedures. In this sense, an example can be the studies performed 
by the USACDA and SIPRI on African countries. The negative impact of defense 
spending on GDP growth was about four times greater according to the USACDA data 
than according to the SIPRI data.5 
In the case of Romania, as well as for most of the other countries, the official data 
reported by the Ministry of National Defense (MoND) differed from the data available 
from the Ministry of Finance (MoF). During the last ten years, Romania went through a 
large process of restructuring the governmental organization, a process that imposed 
significant changes in (a) the accounting system and (b) the national budget structure. As 
an effect of these changes, particular difficulties in finding reliable, comparable long- 
term series of defense expenditure data must be faced. 
The forecast of the Romanian defense expenditures in Chapter VE was elaborated 
under the assumption of political and security stability over time. Thus, any major change 
in the political or security environment will probably change the results of the forecast. 
E.       METHODOLOGY 
This paper is composed of seven parts: (a) a review of the events after the end of 
the Cold War and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, (b) an analysis of the current 
status of the ex-communist states and the way they can meet their security needs in the 
Con^tZoL^ ^S3M iliteiy EXPenditUreS and Gr0Wth ™ LCSS Devd0ped Countries'Jou™1 °f 
future, (c) an analysis of the resource allocation process, (d) identification of NATO 
imposed requirements on aspiring countries, (e) an assessment of the defense resource 
allocation and restructuring needs of the Romanian Armed Forces, and finally (f) 
recommendations for improving military organization reform process. The study is 
primarily a literature research and a compilation and critical evaluation of the existing 
approaches on military expenditures and defense planning. 
F.        ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis consists of seven chapters following the introduction. Chapter II is an 
overview of the European political and security environment after the end of the Cold 
War and collapse of communist regimes. Chapter m presents Romania's situation after 
the 1989 Revolution. Chapter IV presents an overview of literature on the policy aspects 
of defense budgeting. Implications of defense policy on the budgetary process are 
followed by a discussion of the economic implication and the role of policy analysis. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the development of budgeting systems and lessons 
learnt from past implementation of these systems. Chapter V analyzes the defense 
resource allocation process adopted by the Romanian Armed Forces. Chapter VI focuses 
on the restructuring process of the armed forces in the context of the implementation of 
the new resource allocation system. Chapter VII contains a forecast of the Romanian 
defense expenditures. Chapter VIII summarizes the findings of the thesis and suggests 
some recommendations for further research. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
II.      OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE 
A.       COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST REGIMES IN EUROPE AND THE 
DISMANTLING OF THE WARSAW TREATY 
The great political change in Eastern Europe in 1989 shook contemporary 
international relations. This change had a global historical significance. It started in 
Poland, spread to Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania, 
overthrew   communist   one-party   dictatorships,   and   achieved   democratization.   It 
demonstrated the vitality of liberty and democracy, destroyed the Berlin Wall, led to the 
end of the Cold War, and created a new European order. 
The final results of these political changes are very difficult to forecast, but some 
of them are already evident. East Germany has already been absorbed into West 
Germany. Many of the former communist countries transformed in democracies and 
introduced market economy and the stock-company system. 
The former socialist bloc has been reabsorbed into the capitalist world system as 
communist and socialist ideology lost their attraction. Liberalism, democracy and the 
market mechanism but also even capitalism has gained a better image. 
In January 1990, in his first State of the Union address, President Bush of the US 
proclaimed the beginning of a new period of world history as a consequence of "the 1989 
revolution in Eastern Europe," and he proposed a new European disarmament initiative.6 
6
   Bush,   George,   State   of the   Union   Address,   January   31,   1990,   Available   (Online)- 
[http://www.mterlink-cafe.com/uspresidents/1990.htm]. 15 March 2001. 
For people in Europe or the United States, it might be natural that this series of political 
changes was seen as »a series of revolutions," variously called a »self-controlled 
revolution" in Poland, a "peaceful revolution" in Hungary, a "peoples' revolution" in East 
Germany, a "velvet revolution" in Czechoslovakia and an "anti-communist revolution" in 
Romania.7 
After the democratic revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact 
became moribund and was formally declared "nonexistent" on July 1, 1991, at a final 
summit meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague. Deployed Soviet troops were 
gradually withdrawn from the former satellite countries, which were now politically 
independent countries. The decades long confrontation between Eastern and Western 
Europe was formally rejected by members of the Warsaw Pact. 
B.       A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The failure of the "real socialism" model, combined with the disappearance of the 
Soviet Union from the political map, and the end of the Cold War, resulted in profound 
changes in the international political, economic and security system. Former members of 
the Warsaw Pact and newly emerging countries were left in a security vacuum. The new 
players were too weak to face new tensions, political and economic instabilities and 
security risks. Logically they started seeking guarantees and assurance for a lasting peace, 
which they can receive only in alliance with the system of collective defense that has 
already proved its validity. The stage that was set for confrontation needed to be 
Socia^d^ZlZ   wT AvaSnm ^ Tr^lf™ *"*"* ReV°luti°°> ^otubashi Journal of 
March 2001 ^^^ [httP://membersJcom.home.ne.jp/katori/1989.html]. 15 
rearranged and the framework needed to be created for blurring and softening the edges 
of the interests of the US, Western Europe, and Russian powers in Europe. 8 
These led to the need for establishing a new European security architecture and 
the reconsideration of existing military institutions. The reconsideration of the military 
institutions was driven by the intention of the West to promote security and stability in 
Europe and to expand democratic system and its values. 
NATO, surviving this exciting'historic time and rapid changes, turned out to be 
the means for "preserving and extending this European Civil Space" as far as possible in 
both time and terrain.9 However, it was not the only task and dilemma it had to resolve. 
The elimination of the primary threats in the former bipolar model of international 
relations had to be reconsidered. The defense capabilities of the organization had to be 
kept, but re-focused and adapted to the new political environment; i.e. ready to accept 
new missions ranging from peacekeeping to the prevention of terrorism and organized 
crime. The fragile and uncertain relations with Russia had to be reconsidered and efforts 
had to be made to keep Russia in the arena of democratic changes. Thus, from a mainly 
defense oriented organization NATO became an influential institution with decisively 
political functions. The last summit in Washington in April 1999 analyzed NATO's 
achievements, defined its new role and determined some of the future key issues of its 
long-term agenda. 
Goodby, James, Can Collective Security Work? Managing Global Chaos, p. 243, United States 
Institute of Peace, 1998. 
The US Ambassador Hunter, Roberts, Enlarging NATO: Reckless or Requisite? Available (Online): 
[http://www.fas.org/rnan/nato/index.htrnl]. 20 January 2001. 
9 
NATO changed and adapted its internal civil and military structures, reshaped its 
posture offerees and echelons for combat and peace support operations. In the process, 
NATO made these units more flexible, capable of addressing multiple tasks and missions 
with increased operational capability to face the challenges of the 1990s and beyond.«* 
The Alliance refined its attitude towards the other nation-states (players in the complex 
international arena), accepted three new members, and declared its policy of enlargement. 
NATO's "door remained open" for other nations to join in the future. 
C.       NATO ENLARGEMENT 
The idea of enlargement in not something new for the Alliance. It is a part of the 
task to promote democratic values and a result of the process of consolidation of 
democracy on a global scale when an "unprecedented number of countries has completed 
democratic transitions"!!. The legal roots lay in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty 
where the criteria and procedure for membership, which the founding twelve states 
created can be seen: 
The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state 
in a position to further the principle of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. 12 
The first step of enlargement started in the years of the Cold War in 1952, with 
the accession of Greece and Turkey, then the accession of the Federal Republic of 
10
 For more information see - The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State, anH 
Sr^Ä^: ** Meetin8 °f fte No«h Atlantic Coundi in wSS^ISj^S 
1999. Available (Online): thtrp://www.otan.nato.mt/docu/com/.hrm]. 20 March 2001. P 
HOP1
LJSVXJP"S1SIT9"' AlfrCd' Pr°hlemS °fDem0Cratic T™*°» «" Consolidation, p. 6, The 
NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook, 1999, Appendix 8. 
10 
Germany in 1955 and the accession of Spain in 1982. The historical period gives its 
military or political explanation to the strategic admission of these countries. 
What provokes or makes possible the current wave and the contemporary 
continuation of the process of NATO enlargement also lies in the historical events of the 
millennium and in the change of the bipolar political model.13 The first attempts to define 
the attitude of the Alliance toward the new democracies and to introduce the policy of the 
open dialogue were made in 1990. In NATO's London Summit Declaration the Allies 
stated: 
We today also invite the governments of the USSR, The Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the 
People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO not just to 
visit, but also to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will 
make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations 
in the historic period of changes. Our Alliance will do its share to 
overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion.14 
The Allies supported the idea to foster democratic reforms in Europe, peace and 
stability and to create a better climate for economic growth. The establishment of NACC 
in 1991 at the summit in Rome, which later in 1997 became the EAPC with a new and 
extended role, was a logical continuation of their efforts. The US foreign policy initiated 
the "open door policy" debate and "by late 1990 NATO enlargement has already been 
considered as follow-on to NACC".15 Probably the most important step on the way to 
13
 Croft, Stuart, Redmont, John, Wyn Rees, G., Webber, Marl, The Enlargement of Europe, pp. 22-48 
Manchester University Press, 1999. 
NATO Information Service, London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 
1990. Available (online): |>ttp://www.nato.int/docu/comm./c91067a/htm]. 20 January 2001. 
15
 Solomon, Gerald, The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings of Liberty, p. 19, Praeger 
Publishers, 1998. 
11 
enlargement was the summit in Brussels in  1994, which launched the initiative 
"Partnership-for-Peace" (PfP) and confirmation of the expansion to the East as a natural 
event: 
We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to 
democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process taking 
into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.*«? 
The administration of President Clinton offered in 1994 the PfP program, arguing 
that NATO could not afford to »draw a new line between East and West that could create 
a self-fulfilling prophecy of future confrontation"." It invited all the states from Eastern 
Europe to join the initiative^ aiming to create a substitute of a collective security system 
and to prepare the eventual new members for their admission. The initiative introduced 
the concrete steps of the new security relationship: 
•••we win working concrete ways towards transparency in defense 
budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint 
planning and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such 
fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations... 19 
The PfP initiative indicated the goodwill of the NATO members to help the 
former Warsaw Pact states, including the Soviet Union successors' states, to transform 
their armed forces and to integrate into Euro-Atlantic values while participating together 
PP. 85-lG02!w£ 1J9T M-' NAT° EXpanSi°n: ™e ^^y °f a Decisi°*> "" ^ngton Quarterly, 
Press' ^SiSS" °f M 55 "**Z "* f™ *"" by NAC " B™*S> Bel^ 
^//www.nato^^^ 1994' ^^ (Online): 
12 
in different activities. The initiative promoted democratic civil-military control and called 
for cooperation and interoperability of the armed forces with NATO member nations' 
forces. Its long-term objectives turned to be not only military but also political, fostering 
friendship and stability beyond Europe.20 
The former adversaries, in a short time, learned how to work together and to apply 
the democratic approaches in order to resolve problems and crises of mutual importance. 
However, at the inception of the PfP in January 1994, the creators of the program shied 
away from offering the traditional security guarantees to the Partners. The PfP program 
could not substitute the membership in the organization. The PfP was only able to 
provide the framework for assessing the states willing to join NATO and a framework for 
all those nations not willing to join NATO. 
The Brussels' ministerial meeting, December 1994, was the next step towards 
enlargement. The opening of the Alliance to new members was officially announced, but 
universally valid criteria for accession were not explicitly developed. At this meeting the 
Alliance decided to initiate a process of examination inside the organization to determine 
how the enlargement would take place and to develop the principles to guide the 
process.2* The questions "who", "why", "how", and "when" were left without answers 
Claes, Willy, NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, NATO Review, No.l, 




 NATO, Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, M-NAC-2, 1 December 1994, No.6 Available 
(Online): [http://nato.int/docu/conmL/c941201a.htm]. 15 March 2001. 
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until 1995 when the "Study of NATO Enlargement"22 examined these questions and 
outlined the principles of admission. 
After internal debates about the pros and cons, the Madrid summit in 1997 gave 
the official answer to the question "who" will be in the first round of new members. 23 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were officially admitted into NATO on March 
12,1999. 
The PfP program evolution and the deepening crisis in the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia led to a farther strengthening of the Partners' ties with the Alliance. 
Nonetheless, for such partners as Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, the post-1998 
expansion of non-Article 5 aspects of NATO within the PfP does not represent a 
substitute for the fall-fledged guarantee of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. Hence, the PfP can never supplant the full membership as it is 
enjoyed by the nineteen NATO nations. 
Leading analysts of politics and society in Central and Eastern Europe conclude 
that these states have identified themselves with the history, culture and politics of the 
Western tradition. Tragically, the peacemakers in 1945, in a short sighted fashion, 
forcefully broke these bonds of society and culture and thus disrupted these natural links 
with the West. The outbreak of the Cold War led to the disappearance behind the Iron 
Curtain of the subject people of the Soviet system. 
22
 NATO, Study of NATO Enlargement, Brussels, 1995. 
NATO, Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Madrid, 8 July 1997. 
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With the end of the Soviet Union hegemony, the ex-communist states sought their 
democratic roots but the process of democratization is not an easy one. All these states 
faced political and economic crisis because of a "flattened civic society" and lack of 
maturity in the "five interacting arenas"24 necessary for the consolidation of democracy. 
These arenas are the establishment of a civil, economic and political society, the rule of 
law and a working government. Without ties to the Western European and Atlantic 
institutions, East European geopolitical space will become a no-man's-land between the 
West and Russia. The instability in Central and Eastern Europe also will have a negative 
impact  upon the West unless liberal  democracies  are established in the former 
"communist" zone. To be economically and politically viable, these states need the 
European Union, and for security they need the Atlantic Alliance. 
D.        REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE CANDIDATES 
The list of the potential member states, which at the Washington summit in 1999 
declared their will to join, is still long. The countries applying for membership want to 
live under NATO's protective umbrella and the security guarantee mostly coming from 
the US. The membership for them means political self-confidence, being a part of the 
democratic community of nations, values and institutions. It means stability and security 
for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, the candidates, the so-called 
"have-nots" need the consensus of the members, which means that any new membership 
is a matter of geopolitical and geostrategic interests, negotiations and political lobbyism. 
Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, p. 7 The 
Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
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The Washington Summit in April 1999 introduced the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP), in part to convince the remaining nine aspirants, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, that Article 10, the Open 
Door policy, was not hollow, and in part to assist them in developing forces and 
capabilities that could operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities 
Concept. The MAP went farther than the 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement" in 
defining what aspirants need to accomplish on the path to membership. It was designed to 
incorporate the lessons learned in the accession discussions with the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. 
The MAP includes submission of a tailored Annual National Plan that covers 
political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal aspects of membership; a 
feedback mechanism through a NAC 19+1 partner progress assessment, a clearinghouse 
for coordinating security assistance, and enhanced defense planning that reviews agreed 
planning targets. In fact, the comprehensive MAP program was designed to assess the 
technical preparations and capacities of the nine MAP partners and judge their readiness 
for membership. 
The Washington summit raises a lot of questions and uncertainties. The 
organization felt that the enlargement burdens, the intra-alliance relationship and the new 
members would tend to reorganize the Alliance and its ability to generate consensus. The 
war in Kosovo was a difficult test for NATO for such defense cooperation. The new tasks 
were in conflict with the national interests and objectives, and provoked conflicts inside 
NATO. It was obvious that some of the new members were not prepared for the military 
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security in NATO, such as Hungary and the Czech Republic. They were especially 
behind in defense reform and budgeting. 
Both members and aspirants must very carefully assess the costs and benefits of 
the enlargement process. There are many voices against a future accession25 of new 
members because of existing internal problems in NATO and the new member's own 
failures will probably slow down the process of enlargement, despite the efforts of the 
new aspirants. The April 1999 meeting of the North Atlantic Council determined that the 
next round of enlargement would be taken up at the next summit of the NAC to be held in 
2002. The question remains, nonetheless, both in NATO and Partner capitals, of whether 
there will even be a second round of enlargement. Furthermore, if there is to be such a 
second round, as policy seems to indicate, then the question of "when" and "who" remain 
to be answered26, as well. Definitely the choice will be influenced by the political 
preferences of the national interests of the member states. 
The accession of Romania will be influenced by the last international events and 
the positive aspects emerging out the war in Kosovo, as well as by the implementation of 
the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and the initiation of the accession talks of 
Romania with the EU. Romania motivates its choice of joining NATO by its willingness 
to become part of an organization based on the shared values of democracy, individual 
25 Kay, Sean, NATO and the Future of European Security, p. 103, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 
Inc., 1998. 
26
 NATO, An Alliance for the 21st Century, Press Communique NAC-S(99)64, Issued by the Heads of 
States and Governments Participating in the Meeting of NAC in Washington, D.C., 24 April 1999. 
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liberty and rule of law, as well as part of a region of stability and security, which only 
NATO can guarantee. 
In achieving this strategic objective, Romania went through a sequence of 
political and economic reforms in the last ten years. The evolution of Romania during 
this period of time is discussed in the next chapter. 
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III.    ROMANIA'S STATUS AFTER 1989 
A.       UNIQUENESS OF ROMANIA'S CHANGE 
Romania became part of the "Iron Curtain" midway through the post-Second 
World War flurry of the late forties and early fifties when a Stalinist regime took over the 
rule of the country from a monarchy. Yet the country, in some ways, long remained a 
marginal renegade from the USSR, with significant events including Ceausescu's 
statements against the Soviet-led invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 
1979. 
By the late 1980s, Ceausescu had transformed Romania into a police state. 
Institutions and organizations, even the Communist Party itself, had been eviscerated and 
had become mere instruments for carrying out his will. The Securitate had become the 
chief prop of his rule. Physical hardship and moral despair overwhelmed society. Yet the 
Ceausescu dictatorship, which had come to seem unassailable, was overthrown in the 
course of a single week in December 16-22, 1989. Minor incidents in the city of 
Timisoara led to violence, which quickly spread to other cities. Ceausescu was forced to 
flee Bucharest and then was arrested, tried, and executed on December 25. No formal 
dissolution of the Communist Party took place. It simply melted away. 
The Romanian "revolution" of 1989 appears to have been a combination of 
spontaneous uprising by the general populace and conspiracy against Ceausescu 
organized by reform communists and disaffected elements of the Securitate. A loose 
coalition of groups opposed to Ceausescu quickly formed the National Salvation Front 
19 
(NSF) to lead the country through the transition from communism to democracy, but, by 
the spring of 1990, fundamental differences had arisen within this group over the 
direction and pace of change. Those who favored the removal of all former communists 
from positions of authority and the rapid introduction of a free-market economy left the 
NSF. Those who remained, the majority of them former communists, transformed the 
NSF into a political party that showed little enthusiasm for Western economic practices. 
In elections held in May 1990, the NSF won handily, owing in part to its control 
of the media and in part to the failure of the opposition to mount an effective campaign. 
The opposition consisted of reconstituted National Peasant and Liberal parties whose 
programs harked back to the interwar period and seemed foreign to the mass of voters. To 
counter their anticommunist appeal, the NSF raised the specter of unemployment and 
inflation, which they claimed would run rampant in Romania if the opposition came to 
power. They also promised to protect the social benefits put in place during the 
communist era. 
The NSF assumed formal direction of the country with the inauguration of its 
head, Ion Iliescu, as president on June 20, 1990. An advocate of state direction of the 
economy before 1989, Iliescu, as president, remained wary of private enterprise and the 
move to a free market. Disagreement over the pace of economic reform caused the NSF 
itself to break apart, and Iliescu's supporters formed the Democratic National Salvation 
Front (DNSF). The DNSF maintained its political dominance, as proven by its successes 
in the parliamentary and presidential elections held in September and October 1992, in 
which Iliescu was reelected and his party won the majority in Parliament. A loose 
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coalition of opposition parties, the Democratic Convention, won a significant number of 
votes. 
The approval by referendum of a new Constitution on Dec. 8, 1991, setting up a 
democratic republic, had given promise of political stability. In the new conditions, the 
most intractable problem of all remained the economy. The loss of markets following the 
collapse in 1991 of Comecon, whose members had taken the bulk of Romania's exports, 
and an inability to find new markets in Western Europe had catastrophic consequences 
for an economy already undermined by several  decades of mismanagement and 
inefficiency under Ceausescu. Industrial production declined, prices rose and hard 
currency reserves fell, whereas privatization in agriculture and industry made little 
progress. The crisis revived earlier debates about national identity and models of 
development, as Romanian politicians and intellectuals found themselves once again at a 
crossroads between the East and West. 
After a slow transition process, in 1996, the main opposition coalition, the 
Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR), won the elections. Its president, Emil 
Constantinescu became President of Romania, by defeating Ion Iliescu. The new 
government coalition faced both economic and political crises, as the standard of living 
of most Romanians decreased or remained unchanged. However, the foreign policy 
focused on European and NATO integration. Its major success came in December 1999, 
when Romania was invited to begin negotiations for integration into the European Union. 
The collapse of the National Investment Fund (FNI) in June 2000, a series of 
political scandals, the disillusion of the population with the government, notably for its 
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handling of the economy and IMF programmes contributed to the dissolution of the 
governing CDR coalition. This helped the former president Ion Iliescu and his PDSR 
party to win the elections held in November-December 2000. A new minority 
government was formed by Iliescu's party, the PDSR. The seats in the Parliament are 
shared by five parties: PDSR, Greater Romania Party (PRM), National Liberal Party 
(PNL), Hungarian Democratic Union (UDMR), and Democratic Party. 
B.       ROMANIA'S ECONOMIC EVOLUTION: 1989-1999 
Romania is a country of considerable potential including rich agricultural lands, 
diverse energy sources (coal, oil, natural gas, hydro, and nuclear), and a substantial, 
although aging, industrial base encompassing almost the full range of manufacturing 
activities. In addition Romania has an intelligent, well-trained work force and 
opportunities for expanded development in tourism on the Black Sea and in the 
mountains. 
In 1993, the economy reached the end of a decline in output that had begun well 
before the 1989 revolution. The Romanian Government had borrowed heavily from the 
West in the 1970s to build a massive state-owned industrial base. Following the 1979 oil 
price shock and a debt rescheduling in 1981, Ceausescu decreed that Romania would no 
longer be subject to foreign creditors. By the end of 1989, Romania had paid off a foreign 
debt of about $10.5 billion through an unprecedented effort that wreaked havoc on the 
economy. Vital imports were slashed, and food and fuel strictly rationed, while the 
government exported everything it could to earn hard currency. With investment slashed, 
Romania's technological infrastructure rapidly fell behind that of even its Balkan 
neighbors. 
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Since the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989, successive governments have 
sought to build a Western-style market economy. The pace of restructuring has been 
slow, but by 1994 the legal basis for a market economy was largely in place. After the 
1996 elections, the coalition government attempted to move rapidly and eliminate 
consumer subsidies, float prices, liberalize exchange rates, and put in place a tight 
monetary  policy.   The   Parliament   has   enacted   laws   permitting   foreign   entities 
incorporated in Romania to purchase land and has identified a large number of 
government enterprises for rapid privatization or restructuring. 
Privatization of industry was pursued with the transfer in 1992 of 30 percent of 
the shares of some 6,000 state-owned enterprises to five private ownership funds, in 
which each adult citizen received certificates of ownership. The remaining 70% 
ownership of the enterprises was transferred to a state ownership fund, with a mandate to 
sell off its shares at the rate of at least 10 percent per year. The privatization law also 
called for the direct sale of some 30 specially selected enterprises and the sale of ••assets,,, 
i.e., commercially viable component units of larger enterprises. 
Subsidies to loss-making state-owned enterprises continue to be a serious drain on 
the state budget. Despite delays in privatizing certain large companies, the State 
Ownership Fund has made progress. Altogether, the private sector now accounts for an 
estimated 55 percent of the GDP and employs approximately 52 percent of the work 
force.27 
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The return of collectivized farmland to its cultivators, one of the first initiatives of 
the post-December 1989 revolution government, resulted in a short-term decrease in 
agricultural production. Some four million small parcels representing 80 percent of the 
arable surface were returned to original owners or their heirs. Many of the recipients were 
elderly or city dwellers, and the slow progress of granting formal land titles was an 
obstacle to leasing or selling land to active farmers. 
An acute shortage of foreign exchange and a poorly developed financial sector 
have also been obstacles to rapid economic transition. Outside factors such as the 
collapse of trade with Soviet bloc trading partners, the economic slowdown in the 
industrialized West, increases in imported energy costs, and large losses from UN 
sanctions against Iraq and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, contributed to a 
precipitous drop in industrial output after 1989. The fact that the Danube River remains 
blocked from the Kosovo conflict denies Romania an important transportation route for 
its goods and has further hampered economic recovery. 
In 1993, Romania embarked upon a strict adjustment program that showed 
promising results soon after GDP, which had fallen for three consecutive years, stabilized 
in 1993 and registered 3.4 percent growth in 1994, 6.9 percent in 1995, and 4 percent in 
1996. Since 1997, there has again been a decline in GDP of-6.6 percent in 1997, -7.3 
percent in 1998, and an estimated -4.5 percent in 1999. Monthly retail price inflation 
averaged 12.1 percent in 1993, (the equivalent of 256 percent on an annual basis), but 
declined to 28 percent in 1995. However, inflation picked up again in 1996 and 1997 due 
to excessive government spending in late 1996, and price and exchange rate liberalization 
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in early 1997. Inflation in 1999 hovered around 50 percent. The government has 
committed itself to reduce the inflation rate by half in 2000. 
Subsidies on most basic consumer goods were lifted in May 1993, but support for 
under-productive and loss-making state-owned industries continues to be a serious drain 
on the budget. The government nonetheless managed to cut the deficit, which totaled 
almost 4 percent of GDP in 1992, to only 1.7 percent in 1993. By 1995, however, the 
budget deficit had again risen to about 4 percent of the GDP. The consolidated deficit, 
including internal arrearages, climbed to more than 10 percent of the GDP in 1996. 
Financial and technical assistance continue to flow in from the U.S., European 
Union, other industrial nations, and international financial institutions facilitating 
Romania's reintegration into the world economy. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank (IBRD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) all have programs 
and resident representatives in Romania. Romania has also attracted foreign direct 
investment, which in 1997 rose to $2.5 billion. 
Romania was the largest U.S. trading partner in Eastern Europe until Ceausescu's 
1988 renunciation of the Most Favored Nation (non-discriminatory) trading status 
resulted in high U.S. tariffs on Romanian products. Congress approved restoration of 
MFN status effective November 8, 1993, as part of a new bilateral trade agreement. 
Tariffs on most Romanian products dropped to zero in February 1994 with the inclusion 
of Romania in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Romania also signed an 
Association Agreement with the EU in 1992 and a free trade agreement with the 
25 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1993, codifying Romania's access to 
European markets and creating the basic framework for further economic integration. At 
its Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the European Union invited Romania to formally 
begin accession negotiations. 
After years of high inflation, economic decline, and large trade and fiscal deficits, 
Romania's economy is finally showing signs of recovery. Booming exports are improving 
the country's precarious balance-of-payments position and encouraging growth. 
Compared to the previous year, Romania's exports in the first five months of 2000 were 
up about 27 percent thanks to the depreciation of the Romanian currency (the leu) and an 
export tax cut. 
As a result, despite the severe drought that battered the agricultural sector in the 
summer of 2000, Romania's GDP in 2000 is expected to grow a very modest 0.7 percent 
while inflation recedes from 44 to 37 percent. That would mean the first growth in 
Romania after three years of recession, which included a devaluation of the leu and the 
country's near-default on foreign debt payments in 1998. 
C.        ROMANIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY: NATO AS THE ONLY OPTION 
The failure of the model of "real socialism», the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union from the political map, the end of the Cold War, and the dismantling of the 
Warsaw Pact resulted in profound changes in the international political, economic and 
security system. The former members of the communist block and newly emerging 
countries found themselves in a security vacuum. The new players were too weak to face 
the new tensions, political and economic instabilities and security risks and logically they 
started seeking guarantees and insurance for peace, which they can receive only in an 
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alliance with the system of collective defense that has already proved its validity. This 
one proved to be NATO. 
The post-communist evolution of the new democracies in the East has 
undoubtedly different dynamics, but the foreign policy of Central and Eastern European 
States is focused on the same strategic objective: integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures. 
The Romanian approach to this objective exceeds the framework of military 
interest for defense and security policy. It constitutes a definite option for the values and 
principles of Western democracy. Therefore, integration into the economic and security 
structures of the Euro-Atlantic area stands as the fundamental priority of the Romanian 
foreign policy. It relies on the firm support of the entire Romanian society. 
In this respect, all the opinion polls carried out during the last years in Romania 
by prestigious international and Romanian institutions, reached the same results: 
integration into NATO is supported to a high degree (more than 70 percent) by the 
population. Moreover, in spite of the consequences of the Kosovo crisis, the population is 
ready to accept the costs of the integration into NATO's military structure. The entire 
political spectrum of Romania reflects the national opinion. All the political forces 
openly support the efforts made by the government to accede to the North Atlantic 
Alliance. 
This level of support is prerequisite, but it is not sufficient to achieve the 
objective. The Romanian population and political forces are aware that NATO does not 
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need new members who ask for security, but allies who are able to contribute to Euro- 
Atlantic security and stability. 
ensue Romania wants to join NATO as a member with all rights and duties, which 
from the Alliance membership. In this respect it adhered from the very beginning to the 
principles, objectives and commitments stipulated by the PfP Framework Document, 
being in fact the first country to sign it in January 1994. Participation in the PfP was seen 
as a means to pave the way for NATO membership, as well as to address regional 
security challenges by extending NATO patterns of cooperation. 
Instead of being discouraged after the Washington summit, Romania reinforced 
its decision to join NATO at the earliest opportunity. The motivation in seeking to join 
NATO remains undiminished: Romania wants to join an organization based on the shared 
values of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law, as well as to be part of a region 
of stability and security, which only NATO can guarantee. Membership therefore 
represents the strategic objective of Romania's defense and security policy. 
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IV.    POLICY ASPECTS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS 
The end of the Cold War requires a profound and continuous reassessment of the 
defense policy. A country cannot be prepared for all kinds of wars, but it must be 
prepared for at least one. Similarly, a country cannot develop every technological idea 
but can develop some which then permit the country to keep up in the race of 
technological revolution. A country cannot be prepared for a perfect protection against 
any threat, but it can afford enough defense to deter any strike or threat against it. A 
country can possess economic strength, which enables it to do more of the things than it 
otherwise could do. Even for countries with economic strength, defense cannot entirely 
be solved due to the same problem that all the countries are facing that of financial 
constraints. 
A.        ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE 
Defense expenditure is often a target for the critics of governments' fiscal 
policies. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the reasons for such concerns. This 
section discusses the "public good" nature of defense expenditure and its impact on 
economic growth. 
1.        Defense as a Public Good 
The main problem associated with resource allocation to defense is its "public 
good" nature. Public goods are commodities or services that are consumed jointly. When 
provided to a single member of a community they are also made available to all others.28 
Gwartney, James D., Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice, p. 98, The Dryden Press, 1995. 
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As long as the utility of a good is different for different people, the problem is who is 
willing to pay for a good that will be consumed by everyone? 
By providing the good to one person, it is impossible to prevent those who are 
unwilling to pay for it from enjoying its benefits. As a result the market system cannot 
lead to optimal production of national defense even if it is in a society's interest to have 
the service provided.29 Due to the conflict between self-interest and the public interest of 
economic efficiency, the government has to intervene and provide the public good. The 
amount that the government would be willing to pay for a particular public good like 
defense will depend on a number of competing goals within its overall national security 
strategy. The impact of defense expenditure on economic growth is particularly pertinent 
in determining the level of defense expenditures. 
2. Impact of Defense Expenditure on Economic Growth 
Due to the fact that military expenditure consumes resources that could otherwise 
be used in the economic sector, e.g. production, and in enhancing human capital, it can be 
considered that this kind of expenditures is harmful to the economy. Since the end of the 
Cold War, the "peace dividend" advocates have been reinforcing this argument. As a 
testimony to the complexity of the subject, a consensus on whether defense expenditures 
have a positive or negative impact on the economy has never been reached. This section 
summarizes some major arguments that have been made on the subject. 
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One of the major arguments that have been advanced against defense expenditure 
is what the literature calls "the crowding out effect".3° Defense competes with other 
government programs, such as health and education, within the government budget itself. 
A disproportionate increase in defense spending may lead to a relative reduction in other 
programs, and in the absence of additional revenue, the alternative for financing such 
expenditures would be borrowing either from the foreign or domestic market. But 
domestic borrowing leads to competition with the private sector for scarce financial 
resources from the market. The result is the "crowding out" of the private sector. Money 
that would otherwise be used for investment is used for public consumption. In a study on 
50 least developed countries, Deger concluded that "an increase in the defense burden 
leads to a decrease in the growth rate through decline in the saving rate, a fall in 
investment per unit of capital, and a fall in human capital formation".31 
Looney argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, recent empirical research on 
third world economies suggests that under certain circumstances, increased levels of 
defense expenditure can enhance economic growth.32 In his research he cites several 
scholars, (for example Benoit), who have shown that defense expenditures may have a 
stimulant effect on economic growth by increasing the aggregate demand. Benefits from 
this additional demand translates into, for example, more production by the private sector 
on the one hand and lower unemployment on the other hand. 
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Benoit also argues that defense programs for most of the countries make tangible 
contributions to the civilian economies as follows:33 
• Feeding, clothing and housing a number of people who would otherwise 
have been fed, clothed and housed by the civilian economy 
• Providing education and medical care as well as vocational and technical 
training that may have high civilian utility 
Engaging in a variety of public works 
Engaging in technical and scientific specialties and defusing such skills to 
the civilian economy 
In support of Benoit's argument, Deger shows that "there are direct and indirect 
ways in which high defense expenditure may have spin-off effects on employment and 
the creation of human capital".34 
In a final analysis, economic considerations cannot be the sole basis upon which 
the level of defense expenditure may be determined. The major determinant for each 
country's national security strategy should be the level of the threats. This argument 
notwithstanding, the need to ensure efficiency in defense programs through the use of 
economic and other analyses cannot be over emphasized. 
3.        Defense as an Economic Problem 
In theory, defense may be regarded as an economic problem. Resources that a 
nation possesses can be used for attaining many national and individual objectives, such 
as national security, social security and economic growth. These objectives are 
competing for the resources available. 
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Hitch and McKean stress that defense depends upon three factors:35 
• Quantity of national resources available 
• The proportion of the resources allocated for defense 
• The efficiency with which resources allocated are used 
If, at the governmental level, the problem is how much should be allocated for 
defense comparative to other domains, at the defense level the problem is how to use the 
resources allocated efficiently. It is in fact an internal problem of the defense organization 
to find and choose the most efficient or economic method of achieving military 
objectives. 
The other factors on which the defense of a nation depends upon are the morale of 
troops, technological and scientific development of the country, character and skill of the 
political and military leaders, and the geographic position of the country.36 
All the scholars agree that defense expenditures depend also upon economic 
factors. Most of them stress the importance of economic factors and refer to the economic 
strength of a nation in contrast with its military forces. The other approach to economic 
factors refers to the constraints on military forces imposed by the budget, and the need to 
limit costs. In this sense, Baldwin complains that "in the Western World costs are a more 
decisive factor in shaping defense than is military logic".37 Being economical may mean 
spending less on some things/activities and more on others, but the real meaning of 
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economizing or economics is always to make the most efficient use of the resources 
available for all activities. 
The literature shows that at first glance, economy and efficiency are two different 
ways of looking at the same characteristics of an operation. Li fact, these two terms are 
logically equivalent. To maximize the attainment of an objective for a given budget is the 
same as minimizing the cost to attain that objective« 
In deciding the size of the military budget usually there is a conflict between 
defense and the other public (governmental) expenditures, but within the military budget 
there is no conflict on how to spend it. Within defense the economic problem is to choose 
the most effective strategy, which should be, at the same time, the most economical one. 
B.       THE DEFENSE POLICY-BUDGET RELATIONSHIP 
The literature mentions that, to a large extent, a nation's capacity to meet defense 
policy objectives depends on its ability to fund defense programs, such as acquisition of 
weapons systems and equipment, and training. A low level of investments in defense 
programs might lead to a failure in achieving the capability needed for meeting the policy 
objectives. On the other hand, a high level of investment might be harmful to the 
economy and would therefore militate against achieving other national security goals, 
such as economic wellbeing. 
Therefore, an optimal defense policy requires consideration of the costs of 
meeting  the objectives.  These  costs  go  beyond  weapon  systems  and  equipment 
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procurement and includes the cost of the various processes and outcomes that contribute 
to overall military capability. 
It is important for the defense forces to implement efficient management policies 
and systems to ensure that defense policy goals are, as far as possible, met. The defense 
policy formulation process should also result in objectives that are not overstated in terms 
of the nation's economic capability. This highlights the necessity to consider the 
economic and policy implications of the budgetary process. 
C.       DEFENSE     POLICY     IMPLICATIONS      ON     THE     RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION PROCESS 
The foundation of all nations is based upon national values, those most cherished 
principles upon which the existence of states are based. These national values form the 
basis of national interests which states will use all their might to safeguard. Arlinghous 
and Barker posit that   "all sovereign states have four fundamental national interests in 
common: survival, territorial integrity, maintenance and enhancement of economic 
wellbeing, and the promotion of favorable world order".39 
A national security policy is developed to promote and safeguard national 
interests from perceived internal or external threats. Therefore, national security is 
concerned not only with the state's ability to use or threaten the use of physical force, but 
with its ability ensure other types of security to all citizens, for example, food and health 
security. The state's national security strategy will therefore comprise a number of 
specific security objectives, including defense policy objectives. 
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M. Dillon observes that defense policy "plays an influential role in constructing 
and reconstructing the political community by mediating its internal as well as its 
external relations through the threat and use of force"/«) The state is able to bargain in the 
international arena because it can back its demands by threat or the use of force, be it 
offensively or defensively. Likewise, in the domestic arena, the state's monopoly over the 
legitimate use offeree enables it to maintain order while carrying out functions for the 
wellbeing of its members. 
The above would hold true if the military is perceived as being in fact capable of 
exercising such force. The military's capability is therefore critical for it to play its 
appropriate role, particularly in the  competitive regional and international  arena. 
Readiness, force structure, sustainability, and modernization are considered to be the four 
"pillars" of military capability.41 
1-        Readiness 
Readiness may be defined as the immediate ability of the military forces to 
execute their missions. The military forces that are designed to execute the missions 
include units, manpower, weapon systems and equipment. From the definition it can be 
deduced that readiness involves both speed and effectiveness in responding to a threat. 
The speed factor from the definition is often criticized. Betts, one of the critics, 
observes that "unless it can ensure that the battle is decided on the first day, a force that 
1988. 4° Dillon, G. M, Defense Policy Making: A Comparative Analysis, p. 1, Leicester University Press, 
ImtiLBn!?99fhard' Mmaiy ReadimSS: C°nCeptS- Ch°iCeS' Co^^ces, p. 37, Tie Brookings 
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could fight spectacularly for one day but would collapse on the second is no more ready 
in any meaningful sense than is one that could not fight as well but could fight longer".42 
Regardless of the speed with which it can deploy, a force that cannot accomplish 
its combat missions cannot be considered ready. Betts define combat effectiveness as a 
product of mass and efficiency, where mass is "the basic organized capital stock human 
and technical, of a military force", and efficiency is "the degree to which units can realize 
their maximum potential performance".43 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that readiness cannot be separated from the 
other  three  military  capability's   "pillars"  of force   structure,   sustainability,   and 
modernization. These are defined below. 
2.        Force Structure 
Force structure refers to the number, size and composition of the units 
constituting the military forces. The force structure is determined based on the analysis of 
the threat, concept of operations, weapon systems and equipment to be employed, reserve 
and mobilization capability, and capacity to fund the adopted structure. 
Very important to force structure is to ability to achieve the right balance between 
operational and supporting service units. For example, effectiveness could be 
compromised in the process of downsizing, when the military focuses on retention of 
operational units at the expense of service support. 
Betts, K., Richard, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, p. 37, The Brookings 
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3.        Sustainability 
Sustainability is the capacity to maintain the military forces performing combat 
missions over a long period of time. Sustainability cannot be obtained without a sound 
logistical system, modernized equipment, information technology, inventory management 
techniques, training and other management systems. Any shortages in meeting general 
and training requirements and war reserves seriously curtail the readiness of the military 
forces and their ability to withstand an enemy in a prolonged conflict. 
4.        Modernization 
Modernization refers to the technological level of the forces' equipment and 
weapon systems. The modernization process involves procurement of new equipment and 
weapon systems or modification of the existing ones. Another aspect of this process 
refers to the "modernization" of the manpower that is supposed to operate and service the 
enhanced weapon systems and equipment. 
Modernization is a process that should not be stopped at the technical and 
manpower level. This modernization also involves improvement in management systems. 
Special attention needs to be paid to such aspects as cost-benefit analysis, cost- 
effectiveness analysis, programming, budgeting, procurement, financial management, and 
information technology. Furthermore, as long as it is efficient in meeting national 
security objectives, modernization may be extended beyond the military to include 
improvement of domestic industrial capacity to produce defense goods. 
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D.        PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 
Public policy affects nearly every activity of an individual's life. We do not have 
to look far to experience the influence of public policy on our life. 
Public policy is the sum of all government activities that affect citizens. These 
policies can come from a variety of institutions at all levels of government: federal, state, 
local. Li essence, public policy is what governments and public officials choose to do or 
not to do about public problems such as health care, economic development, and defense. 
Such policies typically represent a set course of action or pattern of activity over time, not 
a single or discrete decision. 
The capacity to evaluate the policies is important in determining the extent to 
which particular policies or programs are implemented based on stated guidelines, and 
whether policies caused changes in the intended directions.44 
The debate on the impact of defense expenditures on the economy underscores the 
need to ensure that defense related public policy analysis affords the decision-makers an 
opportunity to make efficient decisions. 
Mac Rae and Wilde have called policy analysis "the use of reasons and evidence 
to choose the best policy among a number of alternatives".45 In the same vein, Walker 
and Fisher defined policy analysis as 
a systematic approach to making policy choices in the public sector. It is a 
process that generates information on the consequences that might be 
expected to follow the adoption of various policies. Its purpose is to assist 
44
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policymakers in choosing a preferred course of action from among 
complex alternatives under uncertain conditions.4^ 
Applied to defense, the effect of such analyses has a significant impact, especially on the 
perception of the stakeholders about the value of defense expenditures and may influence 
the way national resources are allocated in the future. 
1 •        Purpose of Policy Analysis 
Bozeman stresses that policy analysis may be used for several purposes such as 
aiding to decision-making, evaluating the direct impacts of policy, problem assessment 
and monitoring.47 m decision-making, policy analysis may be used by applying a variety 
of techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, public choice modeling, operations research, 
simulation, gamming, and other techniques generally rooted in mathematics. This type of 
analysis is called quantitative policy analysis and is best suited when the problem can be 
stated unequivocally, variables are quantifiable, costs and benefits over time can be 
determined, and there is an objective function that can be maximized or minimized. In 
case relevant values for the analysis cannot be determined the analysis turns into an 
intuitive one. 
In evaluating the impact of policy two approaches are distinct. One refers to the 
use of techniques mentioned for decision, but using actual data. Cost-benefit analysis is 
particularly useful in determining indirect impacts in unintended consequences. The other 
Press^T ^ *""* ^ Mana*ement and ™* Anafysb, New York, pp. 265-281, St. Martin's 
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approach refers to program evaluation. This is based on experimental design. Program 
evaluation is used to replace the impressionistic approach with the scientific approach. 
In an assessing and monitoring policy, analysis helps to establish benchmarks and 
critical indicators. Benchmarks are used to compare the outputs of an organization with 
the outputs of another organization doing similar things. By establishing critical 
indicators, an organization has the opportunity to timely intervene and avoid failure in 
meeting its goals. 
Policy analysis proved its universal acceptance in public organizations, but 
sometimes it fails to achieve the intended goals. This happens when policy analysis is 
used to provide evidence for decisions that would already have been made, or for 
"shooting down" programs that would have fallen into political disfavor.48 Policy 
analysis   also   fails  for  political  reasons,  when  "higher  interests"  (national)   are 
subordinated to "lower interests" (organizational, class, individual) by ignoring the 
results of analysis or by not conducting any analysis at all. All policy analysis limitations 
can be made less severe in case the organizational leadership is committed to adopting 
those programs able to improve efficiency in resource planning and management. The 
result of such commitment may be positive when the organization has the capability to 
conduct effective policy analysis and evaluation. Development of analysis capacity is 
further discussed. 
48 Bozeman, Barry, Public Management and Policy Analysis, New York, p. 267, St. Martin's Press, 
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2.        Developing Analysis Capacity 
In conducting policy analysis an organization may choose among three 
alternatives of using in-house policy analysts; relying on consultants; or using a 
combination of the previous two alternatives. 
The selection of one of these alternatives is directly related to the policy analysis 
skill requirements. The skill requirements necessary for conducting an effective policy 
analysis are the skill to comprehend analysis already preformed and the skill to conduct 
the analysis. The first skill requirement is needed by all staff responsible for making 
policy decisions. The second skill requirement is characteristic of consultants. Yet, for an 
organization committed to policy analysis and not having the resources to rely on 
consultants, using staff to work as analysts may be the way to develop an in-house 
capability. 
Policy analysis cannot be conducted without critical data and other resources. 
Among specialists, it is well known that effectiveness of policy analysis comes from a 
reliable database. Downs and Larkey observe that "in spite of enormous volumes of data 
they generate each year, governments have very incomplete, distorted and often unusable 
record of their activities. The data required to get a start on learning what causes what, or 
on forecasting the consequences of various actions do not exist".*? Causes of a poor 
database are the reduced priority and limited resources given to data collecting and 
storing. 
ivtLST5' G?Q88/ W" ^ Larkey' PafriCk °' ne Searchf°r Government Efficiency, p. 243, Temple University Press, 1986. 
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Resources for policy analysis represent another problem. Resources are not 
limited only to money, manpower and databases. There are other resources that can assist 
and speed up the analysis process. Information technology represents a valuable resource, 
which can improve procedures, satisfy needs or alleviate troubles encountered within the 
policy analysis. 
In the real world, it is very hard to find an organization that can relate on an 
unconstrained resource base. Due to the scarcity of resources, governments more than 
other organizations are under constant pressure to cut their budgets. Usually, the 
budgeting allocation process it is seen as a governmental political declaration. The 
amount of money allocated to each program represents in fact the governmental vision on 
spending public money efficiently. Therefore, for governments, it is important to adopt 
those measures that can provide the capacity to conduct an enhanced policy analysis and 
consistent resource allocation according to national interests and values. 
Any public agency or organization faces the same challenges. With limited funds 
and virtually insatiable demand for services, public resources must be allocated to meet 
the priorities. In this respect, the continual development of budgeting systems may be 
viewed as a quest for achieving that end. 
E.       DEVELOPMENT OF BUDGETING SYSTEMS 
In the most literal sense, a budget is a document containing words and figures, 
which proposes expenditures for certain items and purposes. Thus, a budget is a link 
between financial resources and human behavior to accomplish policy objectives. 
Budgeting in the public sector has its origins in the need for legislative accountability. 
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Budgetary systems are very complex and they followed an evolution from 
political/incremental based decision-making to decision-making based on systematic 
analysis and planning. 
Different budgeting systems and their key features are further discussed. To 
provide a basis for future analysis on the Romanian budgeting system in use, the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is discussed in more detail. 
1-        Incremental Budgeting 
Incremental budgeting is a system that constructs next year's budget by starting 
with the current year's budget and then adjusting each program for expected changes. 
Wildawsky suggests that incremental budgeting is based on the concepts of "base" and 
"fair share".50 The base represents those programs that all participants consider legitimate 
for the respective departments and which do not need intensive scrutiny. Fair share 
"reflects a convergence of expectations on roughly how much an agency is to receive in 
comparison to others".51 
Using incrementalism, calculation may be simplified. According to Wildawsky 
calculation involves a study of how problems arise and are identified, how they are 
broken down into manageable dimensions, how they relate to one another, how 
determinations are made of what is relevant, and how the actions of others are given 
consideration.52 
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1.        Performance Budgeting 
Performance budgeting connects inputs to outputs. It was created from the 
necessity of controlling public expenditures and restoring legislative control to the 
government budget. This approach enabled the bureaucracy to keep track of where funds 
were allocated and how they were spent, but it did not account for efficiency in the 
budgetary process. 
Its history dates back to the Taft Commission of 1912 and continued with its 
implementation in the Department of Agriculture. In 1949, the Hoover Commission 
recommended the implementation of the performance budgeting throughout the federal 
government. This commission noted that "such an approach would focus attention upon 
the general character and relative importance of the work to be done, or upon the service 
to be rendered, rather than upon things to be acquired".53 
The performance budgeting envisaged by the Hoover Commission consisted of 
three elements: a program and activity classification of government transactions, 
performance measurement, and performance reporting.54 Program and activity 
classification was necessary for measuring the impact of the government budget. The 
categories provided an aggregate picture of the national economy. Performance 
measurement implied the specification of yardsticks for efficiency in terms of 
predetermined standards, or performance over a period of time, or a comparison to other 
53
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similar organizations. Performance budgets were also constructed so as to provide a 
descriptive account of the tasks and work plan for each department through the structure. 
The implementation of this approach ran into difficulties. Some of difficulties 
came from ensuring the proper classification, while others came from the computation of 
costs that proved to be very complex. Difficulties were also encountered in formulating 
the productivity or efficiency index. 
Performance budgeting benefits were not so dramatic. The system offered a better 
quantitative basis, but decision making had to consider the qualitative aspect as well. 
3.        Program Budgeting 
Program budgeting is a variation of performance budgeting in which information 
is collected by program categories without the details of the performance-budget 
construction. The program budgeting system as it came to be implemented in the U.S. 
Federal Government departments stressed the classification aspects. Activities were 
grouped by agency, and then by mission, purpose or function. Premchand presents the 
Defense Department's budgeting system that became operational after 1961. This system 
had three principal features: a system of classification in which programs were related to 
major objective of policy, a program analysis allowing effective and efficient ways of 
reaching the goal, and an annual budget cycle in which classification and program 
analysis became integral parts.55 
JiÄlST **■*« -' *>""*" O"-* T - «-** P- 325, International Monetary Fund, 1983 
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This system offered by the Defense Department was considered a unique 
combination of economic, managerial, and accounting approaches used in the 
commercial world, and applied to governmental organizations. To that extent, it was an 
advancement over performance budgeting as the emphasis was placed now on efficiency, 
in both an operational and allocative way. 
4.        Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was introduced in the 
Defense Department in 1962 by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and was 
subsequently extended throughout the U.S. Federal Government in 1965. In the simplest 
of terms, PPBS is a system designed to assist decision makers in making choices about 
the allocation of resources among a number of competing programs or alternatives to 
accomplish specific objectives in national defense. 
a.        Fundamentals of PPBS 
The PPBS coordinates planning efforts at the national level of civilian and 
military organizations. PPBS is principally concerned with the management of resources 
to meet strategic requirements. It is a process that operates on an annual, i.e. continuing 
basis. Each of the three processes (planning, programming and budgeting) operates on a 
near continuous basis, although not simultaneously in the same year. In other words the 
three processes may overlap for differing years. Within PPBS, the process moves from 
broad planning considerations to more definitive program objectives, to specific budget 
estimates, which price out programs. 
PPBS contrasts with traditional budgeting processes in two significant 
ways. First, PPBS tends to focus less on the existing base and subsequent annual 
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incremental improvements. Instead, the system focuses more on strategic goals and 
objectives, and the long-term alternative means for achieving these objectives. As a 
result, the planning function has been elevated to a level of importance equal to 
budgetary management and control. Secondly, the PPBS links planning and budgeting 
through programming, a process which essentially defines procedures for distributing 
available resources equitably among many competitors or programs. 
The PPBS process can be summarized in a few words following the 
scheme shown below, in Figure 1.56 Based on the assessment of the threats to national 
security and national interests, a strategy is developed. Requirements of the strategy are 
then estimated and transformed into programs. Programs are developed in packages, 
which ensure the execution of the strategy. Finally, the costs of approved programs are 
submitted as part of the overall government budgets. 
Threat «—► Strategy 
 .  
<—► Requirements 
— , 
<—> Programs 4—► Budget 
Figure 1.   PPBS Sequence of Events. 
In the literature, PPBS is a part of a complex analysis on the government 
budgeting systems. Premchand, one of the scholars who looked at budgetary systems, 
56 
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shows  that  the  PPBS   formulated  by  the  government  involves  three  levels  of 
management:57 
• Policy management: identification of needs, analysis of options, selection 
of programs, and allocation of resources 
• Resource   management:    establishment   of   basic   support   systems, 
improvements in basic budget structure, financial management practices 
• Program management: implementation of policies, accounting, reporting 
and evaluation 
Bozeman presents a more detailed analysis of PPBS, and in this context he 
outlines that at the operational level, PPBS contains the following five formal elements:58 
Program structure in terms of mission, forces, and weapon and support 
systems 
Analytical comparison of alternatives 
Updated force structure and financial program 
Related year-round decision making on new programs 
Progress reporting to test the validity and administration of the plan 
Bozeman also presents the basic steps in implementing PPBS. The first 
step consists of a grouping of activities into "program packages" and breaking down 
these packages into "programs" and "program elements". The second step consists of 
developing a measure of output and effectiveness. In the third step, costs and benefits are 
analyzed and program elements with the lowest net costs are identified.59 
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b. GoalofPPBS 
The goal of any PPB system is to find the most effective resource 
allocation method in order to achieve the national defense objectives. In other words, the 
ultimate objective of PPBS is to provide operational commanders with the best mix of 
forces, equipment, and support within the fiscal constraints established early in the 
planning process. The following section discusses each phase of the system in more 
detail. 
c.        Planning 
Planning represents the first phase of the PPBS process. It starts with the 
assessment of the threats to national security and national interests and culminates with 
the development of force objectives to assure national security. 
The major steps of the planning phase are: 
• Identification of national interests 
• Examination of the world security environment 
• Defining national military strategy 
• Planning the force structure 
National interests are primarily determined at the executive level based on 
the inputs received from a myriad of sources. These national interests are included in the 
National Security Strategy. 
Assessment of the current security environment includes the consideration 
of threats to national interests, international defense policy objectives and current defense 
status. Foreign policy objectives include international treaty commitments. 
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The evaluation of the threat to national security provides the basis for 
defense needs. Based on the overall threat to national security, a national military strategy 
is developed in order to counter the threat. 
After assessing the current world security environment, the next step in the 
planning process provides the development of the military strategy and the force level 
necessary to meet the threat and ensure that defense policy objectives will be achieved. 
The military strategy development includes the following steps: 
• Ideal force level development without taking into account any constraints 
• Resource constraints application 
• Optimal force level development under the constrains 
• Risk assessment and force level adjustment in case that it is necessary 
Planning force structure provides the basis for the programming phase. All 
the planning decisions are documented in the form of guidance and provide the decision 
makers with the framework for determining the allocation of resources. 
The major planning documents that are issued in the planning phase are: 
• National Security Strategy 
• National Military Strategy 
• Defense Planning Guidance 
National Security Strategy (NSS) is a document issued by the executive 
branch at the investiture, in the US. by the President. It contains the national interests, the 
review of the global and regional trends, and a state's political, economic, and defense 
strategies for the next period of time (mandate). 
National Military Strategy (NMS) is built on the basis provided by the 
NSS and identifies the strategic concepts, provides force planning guidelines, defines the 
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base forces at the macro level, and assigns the military force packages. Its validity should 
be the same as NSS. 
The final document of the planning phase is the Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG). This document is developed by the Secretary of Defense and provides 
the components of DoD policy, force and fiscal guidance necessary to construct then- 
respective program proposals and their annual budgets. The main components of DPG 
are strategy, programming guidance, and scenarios. 
d.        Programming 
Programming is the process by which information in the DPG is translated 
into a financial plan of effective and achievable programs. Li this phase, each military 
service prepares a Program Objective Memorandum (POM). This document details the 
specific forces and programs that the service proposes over the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP) period to meet the military requirements identified in the DPG within 
the financial constraints that are mandated by the Secretary of Defense. POM presents 
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense made by the services and contains 
information  about the programs  planned  for  a period  of six  years.  During the 
programming phase, information on current and proposed programs compiled in the 
POM is thoroughly reviewed. Part of this review process contains an evaluation of the 
risks and of the military advantages and disadvantages of each alternative proposed to 
meet the risk. 
POMs are scrutinized at the joint-staff level and merged into the Joint 
Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) document that is then analyzed by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). After the analysis, JPAM is submitted for program 
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decisions to the Defense Planning Resource Board (DPRB) chaired by the Secretary of 
Defense. Decisions of the DPRB are issued in the form of Program Decision Memoranda 
(PDM) and provide the basis for the budgeting phase. 
e.        Budgeting 
The budgeting phase seeks to allocate the limited resources across and 
within the military services according to planning and programming decisions. Budgets 
for all services are submitted for joint review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD). Primarily, responsibility for the budgeting process lies with the Office of the DoD 
Comptroller, which draws on other organizations within the OSD for support and which 
works closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).60 In part, the budget 
review is a fairly technical exercise in which budget allocations made in terms of 
program elements used in FYDP and POMs are restructured for submission to Congress 
according to appropriation accounts. The budget review also involves preparation and 
approval of justification material for submission to Congress. During this phase, the 
Secretary of Defense conducts hearings in conjunction with OSD and OMB staff and 
formulates his Program Budget Decision (PBD) and Defense Management Report 
Decision (DMRD). The first document provides alternatives to service proposals and the 
second seeks to achieve efficiency through improved management practices and a 
consolidation of efforts. 
OMB is a branch of the Executive, which advises the President on budget related issues. OMB also 
combines the various departmental budgets into the President's Budget, which is then submitted to the 
Congress in January every year. 
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5.        Management by Objectives 
Management by Objectives (MBO) is generally defined as a system in which 
specific performance objectives are jointly determined by subordinates and their 
superiors, progress toward objectives is periodically reviewed, and rewards are allocated 
on the basis of this progress. Peter Drucker first proposed this approach in 1954.61 
MBO refers to a formal set of procedures that begins with goal setting and 
continues through performance review. Managers and their subordinates act together to 
set common goals. Each person's major areas of responsibility are clearly defined in 
terms of measurable expected results or objectives used by subordinates in planning their 
work, and both by subordinates and superiors for monitoring the progress. Performance 
appraisals are conducted jointly on a continuing basis, with provisions for regular 
periodic reviews. 
s The objectives of MBO spell out the individual actions needed to fulfill the unit' 
functional strategy and annual objectives. Thus, the MBO provides a way to integrate and 
focus the efforts of the members of the organization on goals of higher management and 
overall organizational strategy. 
Stoner and Freeman suggest that an effective MBO program should have at least 
the following six elements:62 
Commitment to programs. Managers' commitment to the MBO process 
and to achieving personal and organizational goals is required for an 
effective program. Managers must meet with subordinates, first to set 
 objectives and then to review progress toward these objectives. 
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• Top-level goal setting. Effective MBO programs usually start with the top 
managers who determine the organization's strategy and set preliminary 
goals. This procedure gives both managers and subordinates a clear idea of 
what managers hope to accomplish. 
• Individual goals. Each manager and subordinate has clearly defined job 
responsibilities and objectives. For having realistic objectives, individual 
objectives should be set in consultation between that individual and the 
supervisor. 
• Participation. The greater the participation of both managers and 
subordinates in the setting of goals, the more likely the goals will be 
achieved. 
• Autonomy in implementation of plans. Once the objectives have been 
agreed upon, the individual enjoys a wide range of discretion in choosing 
the means of achieving them. 
• Performance review. Managers and subordinates periodically meet to 
review progress toward objectives. During the review they can generate 
and improve objectives and results. 
Downs and Larkey state that "the difference between MBO and PPBS run 
deeper and are similar to those that distinguish the managerial and planning approaches 
to budgeting. MBO concedes that objectives are politically rather than analytically 
determined. The role of analysis is less institutionalized in MBO. Unlike PPBS, MBO 
does not stress the importance of cost-benefit analysis to choose between alternative ways 
of pursuing the same objective."63 
6.        Zero-Base Budgeting 
Zero-Base Budgeting (ZBB) is a system that calls for total cost analysis of all 
programs every year. According to this approach even continuing multi-year programs 
are subject to an intense review and evaluation. 
Downs, George W. and Larkey, Patrick D., The Search for Government Efficiency, pp  166-167 
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The major features of ZBB have been summarized by Premchand:^ 
Evaluation of programs at different levels of resource allocation and 
performances 
• Formulation of the objectives for each agency 
Conversion of activities into decision packages, which are developed to 
show performance at various resource levels 
Evaluation of the decision packages and their further arrangement in 
ranking order 
Decision packages are broadly evaluated and ranked by the performance at 
various levels of resources. These levels are minimum, intermediate, current, and 
enhancement. The ranking order enables agencies to define the minimum effort and to 
indicate the incremental levels of effort above the minimum for each program. 
Supporters of the system stresses that the strength of ZBB comes from the equal 
attention paid to the budget base as well as to increases to the base. Through this, it 
permits adjustments in case of changes in the levels of available resources. 
7.        Implementation and Evaluation of Budget Reforms 
In a study on government budgeting and expenditures controls, Premchand 
allocates an important part to the analysis of the implementation and evaluation of the 
budgeting systems previously described in some industrial and developing countries. Li 
his opinion "the implementation of the systems reveals that those in operation cannot be 
described as a single system but as a family of systems where selected features that are 
relevant and feasible are applied.»65 Mthou^ ^ systems ^^^ fe ^ 
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countries have various names "they also have several common elements such as 
classification, specification of objectives, and evaluation of efficiency."66 
Premchand also noted that in the implementation process several countries had 
difficulties created especially by "the lack of training facilities, shortage of skilled 
workers, inadequate phasing, disillusionment with excessive paperwork, inadequate 
involvement of spending agencies."67 
Experience with the budgeting systems mentioned previously reveals that reforms 
imposed by the use of these systems tend to be successive, not because they are not 
satisfactory in meeting the tasks, but mainly because of rapid changes in the challenges 
facing the government. When promptly implemented, the reforms are clearly helpful in 
clarifying the activities of the government. Although budgeting systems do not offer a 
total solution, they can be a better tool in economic policy and management by reducing 
the gap between the plan and the budget. 
After years of looking for a system that could solve the resource allocation for 
defense, the Romanian Armed Forces have opted for PPBS as a solution. Therefore, the 
implementation of PPBS in the Romanian Armed Forces is discussed in the next chapter. 
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V.      ROMANIAN DEFENSE PLANNING, DOCTRINE AND 
POLICIES 
Since the Madrid summit in 1997, Romania has continued to develop its National 
Defense Policy and shape the structure of its Armed Forces so that the national defense 
needs of the country are fully met in the new post-1989 era. 
Romania's Armed Forces are in the midst of a fundamental transition from a 
formidable but increasingly oversized, expensive and outdated force to a much smaller, 
more capable force. The most important tasks are to reduce size, the structure and the 
infrastructure while increasing training and operating capabilities. The urgency of these 
tasks has been increased by the continuing battle to halt the country's economic slide and 
by Romania's determination to join NATO, if possible, by 2005. The first of these 
conditions dictates that the Armed Forces restructuring takes clear priority over re- 
capitalization. This tough decision cannot be deferred. The goal of NATO membership 
reinforces the economic imperatives and gives the Ministry of National Defense (MoND) 
leadership a clear path on which to proceed. 
Romania's national security tasks are to defend the sovereignty and independence 
of the state; to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, to protect the rights and 
liberties of Romanian citizens, and to promote Romanian interests around the world. In 
support of this national strategy, defense policy and military strategy have been drafted. 
In 1998 the law defining defense planning was adopted and in early 1999 legislation 
directed that multi-year budget planning start in that year. Romania's defense planning 
system is modeled after systems in use in by NATO members. The tasks that remain are 
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system implementation and honing of command and staff skills in the joint arena to make 
the system work as intended. 
The defense planning process is crucial because it defines the first principles upon 
which all subsequent programs are justified and upon which decisions are made from the 
MoND all the way down to field commands. What is vital is that the process generates 
agreed, approved guiding documents, primarily the National Security Strategy and 
National Military Strategy, to underpin effectively the force planning and resource 
allocation process. As force restructuring and re-capitalization go forward, these 
documents are crucial in setting and sticking to priorities across a meaningful, multi-year 
investment cycle. 
A.       ROMANIA'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND CURRENT RISKS 
1.        Identifying the Risks 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies the risks aligned against 
Romania's national security interests. The risk of a major war is regarded as substantially 
reduced, although the international context is noted as uncertain and marked by 
diversified tensions. However, the risk of regional conflict stemming from a local crisis is 
considered increased. The risk of internal conflict, social chaos and anarchy is seen as 
grave. The NSS enumerates both external and internal risks as follows: 
• External risks: 
regional or sub-regional conflicts or instabilities 
terrorism-extremism and transnational organized crime 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology 
illegal use of Romania's territory for high risk activities such as 
toxic waste disposal 
actions by rogue militaries against Romania or its interests 
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• support from abroad of activities that undermine the sovereignty or 
unity of the state 
• restriction on access to vital resources 
•         Internal risks: 
• actions that aggravate economic or financial imbalances 
• organized crime 
• general crises causing a breakdown of authority 
• extremist activities 
• environmental degradation 
2.        Romania's Relations with Neighboring States 
In the last ten years Romania has worked hard to achieve good relations with all 
its neighbors: Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Hungary, the Ukraine 
and Moldova. The highlights of these efforts have been the 1996 Romanian-Hungarian 
Basic Treaty and the 1997 Romania-Ukraine Basic Treaty. Both treaties lay to rest long 
standing ethnic and territorial issues that blocked the development of friendly relations. 
For the foreseeable future, Romania does not seem to have military threats on its borders. 
In rum, Romania's NSS declares that Romania considers no state its enemy. 
3.        Threat Perception and Force Structure 
From a force structure development standpoint, the Romanian threat perception is 
dominated by three major potential conventional military threats and concerns: the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Moldova/Transdniester and Russia. The main 
concern that comes from the FRY is the fear of military retaliation by this country in 
response to Romanian participation in NATO operations directed against the FRY during 
the Kosovo conflict. Threats of retaliation against key sites in Romania occurred in late 
1998 when Romania permitted NATO over-flight rights needed to reach targets in the 
61 
FRY. Despite this tension, Serbia is the only neighbor against which Romania has never 
fought, and Romania has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with the FRY. 
Potential instability in Moldova and the close ethnic and cultural ties with the 
Republic of Moldova lead Romania to be concerned about the developments in that 
country. The presence of a sizeable Russian population and the Russian military in 
Moldova is viewed as a threat both by the government and the Romanian population. A 
renewal of civil war in Moldova or complications with the so-called "Transdniester 
Republic" pose a potential threat to Romanian security in terms of refugees or spillover 
of ethnic conflicts. This will continue to require a sizable disposition offerees close to 
the border with Moldova in future force planning. 
Romanian insecurity and desire for collective security both result from Romania's 
worst case security threat or that of a resurgent Russian or Ukrainian military capability. 
The main worry is that beyond the small Russian military contingent in Moldova, there is 
a large armor-heavy Ukrainian force of several hundred thousand men, and beyond 
Ukraine, in Romania's area of interest, is Russia, an historical adversary, with an armor 
heavy force of over one million men. Though both Russia and the Ukraine are not 
immediate threats, they loom as potential future military threats for many Romanians. 
4.        Determination of an Acceptable Level of Risk 
Romania's military and civilian leaders understand that it is not possible or 
practical to provide a totally risk-free security environment. Similar to other Western 
powers, what Romania seeks in terms of national security is an acceptable level of risk 
and a force posture that provides a credible means to react to unambiguous warnings of 
heightened threats. The missions of the Armed Forces are assigned and prioritized based 
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on likely and proximate threats. In allocating limited resources to high priority missions, 
an acceptable level of risk can be realized with respect to less likely or long lead time 
threats. This can be done by maintaining high readiness levels for the forces needed to 
respond to immediate risks. It can also mean prioritizing investments in capital 
equipment in order to address the most needed modernization requirements first. 
B.       MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES 
1.        Strategic Missions of the Armed Forces 
The NSS describes the missions of the military in peacetime, crises and war: 
• In peacetime, the Armed Forces train to defeat aggression; prevent or 
resolve internal crisis, integrate into European and Euro-Atlantic security 
structures, participate to multilateral operations; conduct joint operations; 
and engage in international cooperation. 
• In a crisis, the military carries out missions under political direction and as 
established by law. These missions include: prevention of destabilizing 
actions; neutralization of terrorists, maintenance of communication lines, 
clearance of areas illegally held; provision of strategic security at borders, 
and response to natural disasters and other calamities. The Armed Forces 
participate in these crisis-response missions only with selected forces that 
are adequately trained and equipped. 
• In war, the Armed Forces are assigned missions based on the nature of the 
conflict and national war plans. Wartime strategy calls for the ability to 
exercise successfully all the techniques of modern warfare, including rapid 
action, information technologies, joint operations, precision weapons, and 
a multi-dimensional battlefield. 
2.        Missions of the Services 
a.        Land Forces Missions 
The overall missions of the Land Forces across the peace-crisis-war 
spectrum are to deter armed aggression, to be prepared to prevent any contained regional 
crises including participation in international peacekeeping missions, and to repel and 
defeat military aggressors against Romania. 
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Primary peacetime tasks are deterrence, NATO interoperability training 
and operations, and participation in international peace operations. Primary crisis tasks 
are to contain and eradicate the effects of internal crises and to conduct disaster 
assistance. The primary tasks in war are to repel an aggressor while limiting the effects of 
the initial aggression and to defeat the aggressor beyond the borders of Romania. 
b.        Air Forces Missions 
In peacetime, the Air Force engages in airspace surveillance, readiness 
training, non-combat evacuation operations, interoperability exercises and airlift 
operations. 
m The Air Force's primary wartime missions are to conduct operations 
cooperation with the other services and/or as a part of multinational force groups; for the 
purpose of gaining and maintaining control over airspace, and to provide support for land 
forces and the Navy engaged in operations. 
c.        Naval Forces 
The Naval Force's missions are to promote and defend maritime national 
interests to carry out decisive and efficient combat actions, either independently or in 
cooperation with other forces in order to ensure freedom of navigation and Romanian 
sovereignty. The fleet will ensure sovereignty over the natural resources in the exclusive 
economic zone to defend Romanian Black Sea borders. 
The Naval Force has a clear sense of the strategic value of the Black Sea, 
and especially, the Danube. With the planned development of a Transcaucasus oil 
pipeline, Romania is confident that commercial traffic on the Danube will increase. As 
such, the defense of the littoral zone and the Danube and Delta are linchpins in the Naval 
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Force's   mission   plans.   To   further   regional   cooperation   and   promote   NATO 
interoperability, the Naval Force mission includes regular participation in NATO PfP 
exercises. 
C.       ROMANIA'S DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEM 
Romania's defense reforms after 1990, from the perspective of joining the 
Alliance, tried to generate a defense planning system much like NATO member systems. 
This process proved to be difficult, especially in developing and getting political 
approval, for fundamental strategic documents. These documents are essential to moving 
toward and implementing the defense planning process. 
The major documents, which are the basis of the defense planning process in the 
Romanian Ministry of National Defense and Armed Forces, are: 
• National Security Strategy 
• Defense White Paper 
• National Military Strategy 
• Strategic Directives 
1.        National Security Strategy 
The capstone document for Romania's national defense planning is the National 
Security Strategy (NSS). From it, all ministries and institutions involved in national 
security and defense are to establish implementing policies, programs and plans. The 
NSS evaluates the international security environment, defines objectives and interests as 
well as external and internal risks, and gives direction for action to implement the 
strategy. 
The NSS is a document issued by the President and is presented in front of the 
Parliament soon after taking office and is intended to cover the four-year period of the 
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mandate. The first NSS was issued in 1998. Although in December 2000, a new President 
and Government took office after Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the new NSS 
has not been issued. Other basic documents face a similar situation. 
National security objectives defined in the NSS have been considered in the 
MoND decision making in drafting the National Military Strategy. The NSS states that 
Romania's strategic national security objectives are: 
• To defend Romania as a sovereign, independent and indivisible state 
• To consolidate democratic institutions and rule of law 
• To protect its citizens and their fundamental rights and liberties 
• To protect and promote Romanian interest around the world 
Romania's foremost international goals are to join NATO and the EU and to 
develop privileged relations with their members, such as the 1997 Strategic Partnership 
with the United States. Romania also intends to be an active member of the other security 
organizations. 
2.        Defense White Paper 
The MoND prepares a Government White Paper for implementing the national 
defense portion of the NSS. The White Paper covers the same four-year period as the 
NSS and an eight-year forecast. The document is submitted to Parliament for approval 
soon after the new government takes office and establishes: 
Objectives and principal responsibilities of the agencies and institutions 
mvolved in national defense 
• Missions and activities of these agencies and institutions 
• Human, material and financial resources to be provided to each agency 
and institution annually for accomplishing its' assigned tasks 
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From NSS and the White Paper, every institution and agency involved in national 
security develops its own strategies, programs and plans. All these subordinate plans 
cover the same four-year time period and must be approved by the Government. 
3.        National Military Strategy 
The National Military Strategy (NMS) is the military product elaborated from the 
NSS and the White Paper. Once approved it is to be the primary reference for defense 
planning over the next four years. NSS guidance with respect to missions for the 
Romania's military is: 
• To deter and if necessary prevent any possible aggression against Romania 
• To work towards integration into NATO military structures 
• To increase Romania's military contribution to regional stability 
The NSS further charges the military to reshape and restructure the Armed Forces 
based on the new environment, new tasks and new resource realities. 
The NMS is developed inside the MoND and must be approved at the executive 
level. The NMS is the comprehensive document that guides the multi-year defense 
planning process. It delineates Romania's military strategy in terms of its principles, 
objectives, operational concepts, strategic missions, and organization of the armed forces, 
including its civilian control, command arrangements, training and principal equipment. 
Romania plans to implement its military strategy by first improving its means of 
self-defense and then by succeeding in its long-term goal of integration into NATO's 
collective defense system. Selected highlights of the NMS are presented below. 
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a.        NMS Principles 
The main principle of the NMS is its strictly defensive character. This 
includes maintaining defensive capabilities and operational readiness to deter aggression 
and defeat an attack, either through self-defense or in the context of collective defense. 
The other principles of national defense include rapid response, the avoidance of strategic 
surprise and the conduct of simultaneous or sequential operations. Romania asserts that it 
may operate outside its borders within the context of multi-national operations. 
b.        Goals and Objectives 
The fundamental goal of the Armed Forces is to protect sovereignty, 
independence and unity of the Romanian State. This goal is supported by specific 
objectives to be achieved in peacetime, in response to crisis, and in time of war. 
In peacetime, the Armed Forces are to deter aggression, build a credible 
defense system, achieve the standards for integration into NATO, improve relevant 
legislation and democratic controls and participate in international operations. 
In crisis, the Armed Forces are to respond to political plans for either 
internal or regional crisis management and to limit or eliminate the effects of disasters. 
In war, the Armed Forces are to repel any aggression and to contribute to 
collective defense if so established by international agreements. 
c.        Operational Concepts 
Romania's defense posture includes the concepts of early warning, rapid 
response, major defensive operations, prosecution, and if necessary, of aggressor 
elements outside its territory, heading off potential aggression by participating in multi- 
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national regional stability operations, and maintenance of an infrastructure capable of 
receiving reinforcements. 
d.        Organization, Equipment, Training, Command and Control and 
Resourcing of the Armed Forces 
The NMS provides an appropriate strategic overview of these areas. The 
words are a combination of expert advice to national and legislative leaders on the 
requirements in each area, and guidance to the Armed Forces on priorities and direction 
to deal with transition problems in a given order. 
4.        Strategic Directives 
The Strategic Directives lay out the methods of defense planning, military 
planning (strategic and operational), and defense programming. 
Strategic and operational planning guidance flows from the NMS by means of 
Strategic Directives that set forth procedures, guidelines, planning principles, and 
methods for conducting planning. The Directives describe how strategic and operational 
plans are to be developed for peace, crises and war. Plans span the full spectrum of 
military operations, from internal humanitarian relief to major external conflicts. The 
Operational Plans (OPLANs) are developed by the Joint Defense Staff. 
Strategic Directives also provide elements for the development of programs for 
constituting, modernizing and preparing the force. Programs are for four years, with an 
eight-year outlook. Each program is allocated a budget. Progress on each program is 
reported to the Government annually, where modifications can be made and budgets 
adjusted. 
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D.       MULTI-YEAR PLANNING SYSTEM 
Multi-year planning is an essential characteristic of effective defense planning, 
force planning and resource allocation. Romania has already taken the first step towards 
implementing a multi-year plan. 
Romanian has received U.S. advice on how to develop a multi-year planning 
programming and budgeting system. The first multi-year planning effort was conducted 
in April through October 1999. The intent of this effort was to put in place an approved 
multi-year budgeting plan prior to the 2000 election season, when further planning may 
have been suspended for political reasons. The multi-year plan was also used to prepare 
Romania's Membership Action Plan necessary for developing forces and capabilities able 
to operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept. 
This multi-year planning effort by the MoND, the Joint Defense Staff and the 
Service staffs of the Armed Forces was a crucial first step in committing to a true process 
of fiscally constrained force planning. It is also the linchpin to adopting a long-term 
strategy for the Armed Forces restructuring toward a more compact, more capable 
military. 
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VI. RESTRUCTURING THE ARMED FORCES 
The need to reform the Romanian military institution became evident after the 
1989 Revolution and the changes, which occurred, internationally. The aim of the reform 
was to change the Armed Forces inherited from the communist regime into a modern 
institution capable of fulfilling its new missions and contributing to European and Euro- 
Atlantic integration. 
A.       THE WAY TO A NEW FORCE STRUCTURE CONCEPT 
As a result of the political, social and economic changes which have taken place 
following the December 1989 Revolution, and in view of the major developments in the 
security environment in Europe, the Romanian Armed Forces (RAF) have begun a 
significant process of reform since January 1990. The restructuring process went through 
three stages during 1990-1999:68 
• The goal of the first stage (1990-1994) was to first start to change the 
structure, eliminate political control by the communist parry, and develop 
a new legislative framework for defense 
• The second stage was characterized by completion of structural reforms, 
reorganization of the Armed Forces to units similar to those belonging to 
NATO member states, beginning the process of achieving interoperability 
with NATO forces based on the PfP program, reform of the military 
education system. 
• The third stage was characterized by reorganization of the command and 
staffs in a modular way compatible with NATO structures, development 
of a new personnel strategy, reconsideration of an officer's professional 
career, implementation of the interoperability objectives assumed within 
PfP. 
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The strength of the Romanian Armed Forces (RAF) was reduced from 320,000 in 
1990 to 180,000 personnel at the end of 1999. 
B.   THE FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
During the NATO Madrid Summit in 1997, the Alliance decided that its door 
would remain open to new members, and they paid particular attention to the aspirants, 
including Romania. Under these circumstances, the U.S. signed a Strategic Partnership 
with Romania with the expressed purpose of working together to make Romania the best 
possible candidate for NATO. 
At the Washington Summit in 1999, NTO reaffirmed that the door to new 
members remains open. As a specific instrument for getting closer to the Alliance, NATO 
established the concept of MAP for all aspirants to follow voluntarily. MAP calls for 
elaboration of planning targets for developing those defense capabilities that directly 
relate to NATO missions. 
hi 1999, Romania worked to develop a national defense capability and structure 
for the future. Underscoring this work is a program of restructuring and reform that 
addresses both the decision-making mechanism within the MoND and the development 
of a capable, potent, effective and affordable Armed Force structure. The process has 
been iterative and has been based on an analysis of political goals, financial constraints 
and military capability requirements. The approach to this work has deviated from the 
linear single-year planning method of the past to a cyclic, iterative multi-annual planning 
process. This new approach has given the MoND the ability to assess the cost associated 
with a deliverable national defense. It also guarantees a clear visibility of the national 
defense effort and puts a sound instrument for planning at MoND's disposal. More 
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importantly, it gives national defense the transparency and credibility it needs if Romania 
is to join NATO. This approach has been the vehicle on which Romania has been able to 
develop a framework action plan for national defense and subsequently to draw up the 
MAP called for at the Washington Summit. 
The work to date has been developed in such a way that it has both depth and 
robustness. Depth is there because the analysis has brought Romania to the point where it 
is able to put before NATO a framework action plan for accession into the Alliance that 
starts the basic principles and develops a national defense effort along analytical and 
logical lines. As a first step, a policy baseline has been established and translated into a 
statement of the national defense or military requirement. In turn, this requirement has 
been defined through determining key planning assumptions, identifying military tasks, 
allocating military resources to the tasks, determining risks and readiness states, and 
developing force structure options. The national defense effort has been further refined 
by costing the force structure options to determine what is affordable. Lastly, the iterative 
process has been enabled to make a decision on which national defense posture to adopt 
that would best meet the nation's needs, fulfill policy objectives, and remain affordable. 
Robustness has been built up by a comprehensive analysis of the national defense 
costs. It is a multi-layered analysis that gives a clear definition of the individual value of 
the various components involved to create a national defense. 
C.        STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY PLANNING PROCESS 
Once the operational requirements have been defined, i.e., political options and 
military capabilities, the effort to design the national defense dimension was made based 
on cost parameters between two budget limits that have provided a strict discipline during 
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the planning process. The budget profile, i.e., the costs, were later related to the force 
structures' dimensions designed in accordance with the NSS and the NMS described in 
the previous chapter. It is obvious that the national defense requirements would imply 
much higher costs in a situation whereby Romania would not be able to count on any 
security guarantees, as opposed to a situation in which the country would enjoy sufficient 
security guarantees, and especially membership in a military alliance. Simply put, as can 
be seen in Figure 2, the less Romania is embraced within the framework of a collective 
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Figure 2. Answering the Question of National Defense Needs. 
The financial effort required for reshaping and modernizing the Armed Forces 
will be ensured by budgetary allocations in compliance with the development of the 
national economy. 
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Vn.   A FORECAST OF ROMANIA'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
A.       AN ECONOMIC FORECAST 
Romania's past difficulties in implementing economic reform suggest that any 
projection of its future economic prospects be viewed with caution. However, Romania's 
latest efforts have, in fact, resulted in a decline in inflation over the past years, increased 
fiscal discipline, and increased reliance on market mechanisms. These developments, 
although not yet indicative of a sustained positive trend, suggest the examination of a 
possible path for future GDP growth. 
For planning purposes, the MoND asked the MoF for an assessment of Romania's 
GDP for the next ten years. The figures received from the MoF shows a moderate growth 
at a rate of 2 percent per annum for 2000 and 2001 followed by a growth of 3 percent per 
annum up to 2007. This projection is considered to be a realistic approach if we take into 
consideration that IMF forecasted for Romania a growth rate of 3 percent for 2001 and 4 
percent for 2002. Projections of the GDP forecast for future years is shown in Table 1. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GDP (Bill.) $39.7 $40.5 $41.7 $43.0 $443 $45.6 $46.9 $483 
Table 1. Forecast of GDP. 
This projection helped to define both the likely range of possibilities as well as 
depict the dire nature of Romania's present point of departure for defense restructuring. It 
portrays a plausible GDP trajectory within which future defense spending must be 
defined. 
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B.       IMPACTS ON ROMANIAN DEFENSE BUDGET 
Due to the commitment of the Parliament to approve a defense budget for the year 
2000 of approximately 1.8 percent of the projected year 2000 GDP, Romania's defense 
budget is comparable to other continental European allies. Given current economic 
conditions, the current portion of the GDP allocated to defense is unlikely to increase 
greatly over the next six years. As the graph in Figure 3 shows, in terms of the 
percentage of GDP currently apportioned to defense, Romania approaches the NATO 
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Figure 3. Percentage of GDP Spent on Defense. 
Moreover, further contraction in the Romanian economy this year could increase 
internal pressures for reducing the overall defense budget. As a result, Romania will be 
hard pressed to sustain projected defense spending, given the pressure to restrict public 
sector expenditures. Any reforms will take place under the assumption that public sector 
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spending will remain flat or even shrink in the upcoming years. Therefore, over the short 
and medium term, any costs incurred in restructuring the armed forces will have to be 
based primarily on the reallocation of resources and cost offsets. 
The restructuring measures that Romania faces in the near term fall into four 
broad categories: personnel reductions, reductions in equipment holdings, unit/command 
deactivations, and infrastructure and stockage divestiture.   All these actions will cost 
money up-front before larger, permanent savings can be realized over time. 
C.       DEFENSE BUDGET PROFILE 
The defense budget as it was projected for the framework action plan started from 
a figure of 620 million dollars in 2000, which represented 1.55 percent of the forecasted 
GDP for that year (39.7 billion dollars). Authoritative figures for the GDP show a gradual 
but steady rise in the GDP for the year 2007, predicted to be 48.3 billion dollars as it is 
shown in the content of this chapter. Using these facts as a base assumption, a number of 
budget profiles have been projected. 
1.        A Steady Increasing Budget 
In this case, the defense budget shown in Table 2 was considered to rise at a 
steady rate of 0.05 percent of the GDP annually from a 2000 base of 1.55 percent of the 
GDP to a figure equal to 1.9 percent of the GDP in 2007. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Budget (Mill.) S620 $650 S690 S730 $780 $820 $870 $920 
Table 2. Steadily Increasing Budget. 
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2.        An Enhanced Steadily Increasing Budget 
The defense budget should rise at a steady rate of 0.05 percent of the GDP 
annually from the current government figure of 1.7 percent of the GDP in the year 2000 
to 2.05 percent of GDP in 2007, as shown in Table 3. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Budget (Mill.) $670 $710 $750 $800 $840  $890 $940 $990 
Table 3. Enhanced Steadily Increasing Budget. 
3.        An Optimum Budget 
This assumption started from a figure of approximately 1.8 percent of the GDP in 
the year 2000 and finishing at 2.2 percent of the GDP in the year 2007, as shown in Table 
4.70 The trend of this budget line shows that initially defense spending remains flat and 
then rises with an upturn in the GDP after the year 2002. After reaching the level of 2.2 
percent in 2005 defense spending keeps a flat rate up to 2007. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Budget (Mill.) $710 $730 $770 $840 $890 $1000 $1040 $1070 
Table 4. Optimum Budget. 
After long debates between the executive and legislative branches, the third 
option was agreed upon. It was a difficult decision to make but considered as feasible 
when taking into account that IMF forecast shows a growth rate of Romania's GDP of 3 
and 4 percent for the year 2001 and 2002 respectively. At the same time, the need to 
accomplish the strategic objective of joining the Alliance contributed in a great measure 
to this decision. 
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D.       BUDGET DISTRIBUTION 
Within the defense budget, personnel, equipment, operation and maintenance 
costs were the three main areas of expenditures. 
Military and civilian personnel costs are made up of salaries, individual training 
costs and the administrative costs of supporting those individuals. The budget share for 
these expenditures should be in a range of 35 - 40 percent. 
The equipment vote is made up ofthat expenditure which goes towards procuring, 
modernizing or leasing equipment for the Armed Forces. The budget share for this 
expenditure should be in the range of 35 - 40 percent. 
Operating and maintenance costs are the necessary expenditures on training and 
logistics needed to deliver a given military capability. There are minimum criteria for 
each share of the stated military capabilities reflecting the level of operational readiness. 
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Figure 4.        The Target Budget Balance. 
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For the first few years it is not possible to balance the budget in desired portions 
simply because some of the adjustments have not been gradual, particularly in the 
personnel area. However, by the year 2005, the budget is intended to be a balance 
between the key areas shown in Figure 4. This distribution compares favorably with what 
most NATO nations spend. 
E.       DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ACCOUNT 
Long term procurement planning is critical to the Romanian goal of achieving 
NATO compatibility and modernization. Procurement of NATO interoperable platforms 
and systems are critical to Romania's ability to conduct operations with NATO allied and 
partner militaries. 
Romania's programmed procurement account is significantly over committed and 
will have to be reduced to come within the defense budgets projected for the year 2000 
and beyond. A sustained modernization program is also essential to improve force 
capabilities as well as readiness. The main problem is that the MoND must develop a 
long-term procurement strategy that can be supported by a reasonable level of spending. 
To do this within the projected defense spending levels, Romania must concurrently 
contain personnel costs and reduce equipment levels. 
A sustained increase in procurement spending is a worthwhile tradeoff in terms of 
actual defense capability when weighed against excess personnel, aging equipment and 
high installation maintenance. These are the essential choices for modernizing Romania's 
forces and making them capable of operating effectively with NATO forces. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
A.       SUMMARY 
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in Central 
and Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact dissolution in 1991, there was a need to 
establish a new security architecture in and for Europe and reconsider the existing 
military institutions because the West also intended to promote security and stability in 
Europe and expand the democratic system and values. NATO surviving these exciting 
times turned out to be the security and defense framework of Europe. NATO had to 
change and adapt its internal civil and military structures, and reshape its posture of 
forces and echelons for combat and peace support operations. The Alliance also redefined 
its attitude towards other nation states, players in the complex international arena, 
accepted three new members, and declared its policy of enlargement. 
The Washington Summit reaffirmed the "opened door" NATO policy for other 
nations to join in the future. As a consequence of the lessons learned during the process 
of accession, discussions with the new members, at this summit NATO, introduced the 
MAP for the aspirant countries as an instrument in assisting them to develop forces and 
capabilities that could operate with NATO under the New Operational Concept. MAP 
also defined what aspirants need to accomplish on the path to NATO membership. 
Facing the new political and economic instabilities and security risks, Romania, 
like other Central and Eastern European countries, started to seek guarantees and 
insurance for its security. These guarantees can be received only in an alliance with the 
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system of collective defense that has proved its valability. This alliance proved to be 
NATO. 
Romania experienced a violent revolutionary change as part of the democratic 
changes that took place in Europe. The victory of the 1989 Revolution has opened the 
path to democratic reforms. The new internal political environment changed by putting 
into place political pluralism and the market economy. 
Since 1989, successive governments have sought to build a market economy. 
Parliament has enacted laws permitting rapid privatization or restructuring of a large 
number of government enterprises. After years of experiencing high inflation, economic 
decline and large trade and fiscal deficits, Romania's economy is finally showing signs of 
recovery. 
The post-communist evolution of the new democracies had different dynamics, 
but the foreign policy of those countries was and still is focused on the same strategic 
objective: NATO integration. For achieving this strategic objective, Romania started the 
process of reforming its military institutions. The reform was focused mainly on the 
defense planning process or resource allocation and reorganization of the Armed Forces. 
In this respect, discussion on defense policy implications on the defense resource 
allocation process highlighted the important role that defense forces play in safeguarding 
national interests; a role that they can only play effectively if they have the requisite 
military capability. Military capability involves readiness force structure sustainabiliry 
and modernization. 
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The effect of defense expenditures should be a major concern for policy makers. 
There is no consensus on the effect of different levels of expenditures on the economy 
and on "how much is enough for defense". An optimal defense policy should provide the 
achievement of security goals without imposing a burden on the economy. Efficient 
planning and management of resources allocated for defense may alleviate this burden. 
For this it is necessary that the defense policy makers should have the capacity to conduct 
effective policy analysis and evaluation. The capacity of conducting policy analysis 
requires skilled staff capable of interpreting economic and other quantitative analysis, 
appropriate management information systems, and other resources necessary for 
performing these kinds of tasks. 
The resource allocation process was reviewed through the analysis of the 
contemporary budgeting systems. Among these systems, PPBS was given more attention 
in the analysis due to the fact that this was designed specifically for defense. PPBS 
encompasses most features of the other systems designed for improving efficiency in 
resource planning and management and was analyzed through its three phases: planning, 
programming and budgeting. PPBS emphasizes the role of rational analysis to justify 
programs. Development of the defense budget involves planning and review of plans, 
developing and evaluating programs, reviewing programs to take into account the 
financial constraints, and budgeting. The above would not be possible without 
considering within and outside defense. 
After years of looking for a system that could solve the defense allocation 
problem, Romania has opted for a system much like of other NATO member's systems. 
The new system introduced can be summarized as follows: based on the assessment of 
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the threats to national security and national interests a strategy is adopted, requirements 
of the strategy are then estimated and transferred into programs, programs are developed 
in packages which should ensure the execution of the strategy and finally, the costs of 
approved programs are budgeted. 
The major documents, which constitute the basis of the defense planning process 
are the NSS, the White Paper, the NMS and Strategic Directives. The NSS evaluates the 
international security environment, defines the objectives and interests as well as external 
and internal risks, and gives directions of action to implement the strategy. The Defense 
White Paper provides the governmental framework for the implementation of the defense 
portion of the NSS. From the NSS and the White Paper, every institution and agency 
involved in national defense develops its own strategy, programs and plans. The NMS 
delineates  its principles,  objectives,  operational concepts,  strategic  missions,  and 
organization of the Armed Forces, including its civilian control, command arrangements, 
training and principal equipment. Strategic Directives lay out the methods of defense 
planning, military planning (strategic and operational) and defense programming. 
In implementing the multi-year planning system, Romania received U.S. advice. 
The first multi-year planning effort was conducted between April and October 1999. This 
effort was crucial for Romanian Armed Forces in committing to a true process of fiscally 
constrained force planning. 
The Romanian Armed Forces reform process started immediately after 1989 and 
covered  three   stages.   These   stages  were  mainly  focused  on  structural  reform 
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reorganization of the armed forces with units similar to those belonging to NATO 
members, and the reorganization of command and staffs in a modular way. 
The introduction of MAP by the Washington Summit called for aspirants to 
develop those defense capabilities that directly relate to NATO missions. 
Romania has further worked to develop a national defense capability and force 
structure for future years. The result is a program of restructuring the armed forces. This 
program addresses both the decision-making mechanism within the MoND and the 
development of a capable, potent, effective and affordable armed force structure. 
The process was a cyclic iterative one based on the analysis of political goals, 
financial constraints and military capability requirements. Once the operational 
requirements have been established, the effort to design the national defense dimension 
was based on costs parameters between two budget limits that have provided strict 
discipline during the planning process. Afterwards, the budget profile has been related to 
the force structures' dimensions designed in accordance with the NSS and the NMS. 
For planning purposes, an estimation of the defense budget was necessary. All the 
scholars agree that defense expenditures depend upon the economic strength of the 
nation. In this context, Romania's past difficulties in the economic domain suggest that 
any projection of its GDP growth should be viewed with caution. Thus, the MoND asked 
the MoF for an assessment of Romania's GDP for the next ten years that should be 
moderate and realistic. Today this assessment seems to be feasible when looking at the 
IMF forecast of Romania's GDP growth rate (3 percent for 2001 and 4 percent for 2002). 
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This projection helped planners to define both the likely range of possibilities as well as 
establish the point of departure for defense restructuring. 
By the commitment of the Parliament in approving a defense budget for the year 
2000 of approximately 1.8 percent of the projected GDP, Romania approaches the NATO 
European average of 2.2 percent. Using the GDP forecast, the MoND analyzed three 
different defense budget profiles. These budget profiles were established and take into 
account different percentages of GDP allocated for defense at the beginning of the 
planning period. For the upcoming years the trend of the percentage allocated for defense 
was considered at a steadily increasing level of 0.05 percent. The defense budget profile 
adopted was the so-called "optimum budget" and was negotiated with the Government 
and Parliament based on the strategic objective of the integration of Romania into the 
Alliance. 
The main areas of the defense budget are: personnel, equipment and operation and 
maintenance. Due to the complexity of the reorganization process and the financial 
constraints, a balance of the budget among these areas cannot be obtained for the first few 
years. This balance, comparable to that of most NATO members, it is intended to be 
obtained by the year 2005. In this balance, the main problems are given by personnel and 
equipment accounts. Personnel issues will be solved by the year 2003 through a process 
of downsizing, but procurement can be solved only by developing a long-term strategy 
that can be supported by a reasonable level of spending. Procurement planning is critical 
for Romania to achieve the goal of compatibility and interoperability with NATO. 
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A capable, potent and effective Armed Force structure is a serious asset for 
Romania to qualify for NATO membership. Romania's eventual integration into NATO 
will directly contribute to strengthening the Southern flank and enhancing stability and 
integration in a region generally marked by uncertainty and insecurity. 
B.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis attempted to provide an analysis of the reorganization process of the 
Romanian Armed Forces in the context of the implementation of the new resource 
allocation and management system based on requirements imposed by NATO for future 
membership status. Starting from the beginning of these processes, it has been proven 
that there is a need for improvement to sustain the Romanian Armed Forces capability to 
perform its ultimate mission of providing national defense. 
The improvement needed for recommendations that could be adopted at the 
strategic level are as follows: 
• The MoND should seek the benefits of the strategic planning process and 
create from the strategic planning a culture among its department heads 
and commanders at all levels. If adopted, this would enable the decision 
makers to anticipate problems well in advance and respond appropriately. 
• The MoND should develop an information technology system which 
would permit the automatization of the planning process. The 
implementation of such a system combined with other management 
techniques would guarantee good results. 
• The MoND should implement an effective human resource policy. The 
good results in future strategic planning cannot be obtained without 
adequate training. Moreover, the selection of the people should be 
reviewed. 
C.       FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study reviewed the reorganization process of the Armed Forces in the 
context of the implementation of the new resource allocation and management system in 
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a broad context for establishing a basis of understanding of the major problems Romania 
is facing in the area of defense. From this study, there are other analyses that could be 
developed. 
In the content of the study, it was shown that defense expenditures might have a 
positive effect on the economy of a country. Following this idea, a further analysis could 
look at the impact of defense spending on the national economy of Romania. Another 
topic for a study could be civil-military tensions provoked by the downsizing of the 
military and measures that the civil society may take for reducing these tensions. 
The competition between defense and the other social and economic domains 
within a society with limited resources always provides good opportunities for analysis. 
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